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The produotl0.l'l ot iron 1n Alllerlca began1n a limited
area east, ot theA.lleghoniea, centered around Philadelphia,
which was also apr1nc1palpol"t of entry for rore1gniron.
AS

early

48

1750,

point structure.

p~lc1ng

was done on. a rudimentary basing

APparently, all prices on domestic 1z-on

were quoted on a Phlladelph1a base and were hIgher in t:he

outlying terr1to'ry where their-on was actua.l1y made.

Tbe

manui'actu1"era absorbed freight in order to move their iron

to the central market, where it competedwlth foreign iron. 1
with the tremendou. growth of iron and steel capaclt,.
at Pittsburgh,. 'Philadelphia did not keep :Lts position .a a
baG., and by the middle

or

the 1880'a, tim-e• • teal plant.

in New aer.8'Y and Eastern pennsl1vania began quot1ngprlce8

from the carnesi. tlanb inPittaburgh.

Th1a marlca the :real

beginnblS of the basing pamt s,.stem ot prleingin the

'United states. 2 This prlcingme1ihod. slowly extended to other
steel product. and producers through the med1tnn of various

poola, tradeagr••menta, and trade associations. B7 the
e.r11 1900f., the basing point slst•• was 1n general use
iIf _.

1. Tbe.Ba.1ns,(.')intproblem, Tempoira17 National Economic

committee

l~onograpJi

42, {Washington, 1941),P4t 41

2. Fr1tz .*.OhlUP' The Ba81nfPOint sllteJR, (Philadelphia,
1949), pp. 17-20. Prank. tette~, '&it Basing point
Pricing.· American Eeonom1caevl.w. xxxv1ii (194S),

pp. 815 ... 16. !'rolessor 'eiter mentions that the German
Steel cartel practiced baaing point pricing intbe
1870 t . , and euggeats that the American companies
probaoll patterned on this model.

blthe at.el lnduatrr under-the lead.r'8hip of the Unl,ted

Itat,•• ste.l eorporatl0n. 1 Thus, the t1r.t 1ru3.u.>trr-wlde us.
0'£

delivered pricing occUrred 'in th. at.fiJ1 industry under

the old "Pltt'sbu,rgh~plUs8Y8tem ••
Shol'tly after 1nduBtllJ'-w1de u's. of delivered pricing

had been ac111eved in the steel industry, tht Portland cement
Industry "dopted a very8btl1ar pr1cSns formula.
probably because tbe

t1nlt.~

This was

statea steel corporat1on" had

become the largeat, single producer of Portland Cement 1n
tbl. count17_

Unl1ke the steel 1nd\\atI'7. however, thecemen't

1nduat17 adopted

a multipl. baaing point

• .,.tem and became

the fs.ret 1ndust!'7 in America to use more than one baaing
polnt. 3

After the adoption of dellvered pricing by the producer.

of Portlatld cement, tbe use of baaing pointe spread quite
rapSd11 to ovh&r industrie..

tittle 1ntoftDat1on regard1ng

the apr.adot del1vel-ed pric:ing 18 ava.1lable. but at lesat
twent,. industrie. ba.veu.ed the 878tem."
Legala.,ct1on against the basing p·o1nt 818tem began in

1920. wben Western steel consumers, protested to the Federal
Trade Commie.ion tbatlJteel price. were too high and .ere
5
be 1ng fixed b7collua1ve pl'act lees. Sinee that t 1me,court

..

017

1. Machlup •..
c1t., p. so.
2. Ibid •• P. . .• ~
3. fiG."
4.
See alao tor a list of industries which are now
.U8mg,or have na.d. the basing point syste••
S. ---...
Ibid.,. P.66.

l1)1(i"..

aetlonon thllu,s'Q.eba,8 been almo.t cont1nuo'l1'.
on Apr11

.6,1~'6,j

Pinally.

the supre.. eourtbandld,(i.olm ,a d •. olt 10ll

in ,. • •• ,againat the uso

i~

ot a.livered

,

pricing b7the pro- "

duoera otPortland cem.nt.1'lble ca.e, it 1. thought b7

many, w111 have the etff)ot ot making the
in an,.1ndu,at17111ega.l.

UI.

ot baaing pointe

More reoently,' in the" 8pr1l'18

ot

1949. the Supreme OOtiJrtba.nded·down a decision against the

or

uae ot delivered pr1c1ngbl the makers

rigid. .teal con-

dUlt. 2 Tbl. ca.8 hal bad the eft.e'or strengthening the,

bel..le,t that ultimatel,. b•• ing po1nt pricing it.elf will be

declared illegal i f 1tcan ,be pl'o ••n the resu.lt of cODsp1raq.1
At the preaentt1me, the eongress of the United sta/tes 1. considering various proposals for clar1t71n.g the atatul of the
basing po1nt .'Jetea.

.A.yet. nothing oonclusive baab.en

decided.

While it 18atl11uncerta1n what the .:act legal Itatu.
of baaing point pricing w111 be.,

80••

induatr1••• inoluding

the ste.l Snduatrr., bav. abandoned the baaing point 8.,St••

and are now' prlc1ng on an ent1re17 different baall.
SOOPE OF THIS S·TtJI)y

This stud,. w111 be cont1ned to adiacu8sionot the
pOlsible 1mpllca.tlo118 of the abandonment of the basinS point
n

1. Federal Trade COmmission v. The Cement Institute,

s.. dti.' 'ml ..

3~

u.S.

' "
2. Federal Trade Comml'~1.pn. v. Tria,n6,le COpduit and cable,
Die. eti. al. '1tilidDoult COur\ or APpear., 1&9 Fea I!
683 (IOtb" ·68

l'S( !9IS,.The high. court dec1sion 18 recorded 1n 1949
and 11 not yet available.
3. of. NewR8Eubll.c, lul.,. 18 .. 1949, p. 23.

178'.. otprl.c1nsb7 the It,.'.11n4u,8t17 lnutah.

FOP purpo.••'

of compar1aon. a rather d.tal1ed dlscus.ion of the basinS
point system w111 be 1ncluded, and to clarity the present
legal .tatuB of deliveZ'fld pl'lc1ng. some court history wl11
be summarized.

without doubt, a new prlcing polio7 1n the

steel indu.stry w111 have 80me rathor farr'hch1ng effeot_,
both on other induatJ;'l•• and upon the econont1

at th1sreglon.

These possible erfe·cts w111 be discus.ed.
PURPOSE OF' THE STUDY

The abandonment ot theba.1ng po1nt 87atem ot priCing
by the steel hldnstr'f creates many problems as to the ad3u.t-

menta which .111 be nee•••ar.,. under thene. prle1ngs18tem.

It w11l be the.1m ot th1l study to Asoertain the posalble
nature and extent ot thcu.e adjustment., and their errect"
both upon the Utah •. teel Industry and upontbe economyot

thlsar....

Since the abandomnent

or

bas1ngpoint pricing

lsa rather recent development, this the.la, ot neee'ss1t1,

will be 1n the na,ture of a predl.etion .a to 80me ot the
poss1bl.economlc 1mp11,catlon8ot th1a actlon.
METHOD OF ADALYSIS
Not enough'b1m-e has elapsed since t'he ateel 1ndustl'7

abandoned the basins point system to make an,. important

decisiona on the basu ot an empirical stud,._

Fo,r thi.

reason, th. . . thc,dot thuatttdy must be cont1nedto ad ••
termination ot the possible implicationa through the \le. of
economic ana1781a.

Although much has been written about

5

the pos.sible effects· and attendent adJus'tments since the

abolition of delivered pricing became a

p~ss1bl11tY',

little

or nothing has 'been said about what mie)lt be the effects on

a particular industry" and the a.onsequent effects on the economy ora. pa.rt1cu.la%' area.

J:o"or this :reason, the use of ex1st-

ing material will baeonf"ined to those stateme.nts whioh can

beapp11ed to this pa:rt1eular study.

'fBi BASDIG pomT SYSTEM

BAmtGROtmD

There are oertain common charaeter1atlc. amongthe1n.
4uatr1•• whleb bave adopted. a:ra temotdellvertaprle1ng. 1
NO attempt will be made atthie tim. to 8ay which of th•••

characteristic. are caua....nd which .ttecta of the baling
point By.tem.

such a discussion can be,llol't profitably under-

taken later :in thi. paper.
Firat, 1nnear17 every industry, freight eoatsare an
important elementot the delivered prioe. 2 It laneCellUJllry

'that'th!. 'be 'the ca8Et tor an7 commodit7 where the price 1.
"""'''"'qiiot'e(r-'ori''i''''aellv'ered bail.'.

tilreight coats war. trivial.

the buyer. would not be vel',. concerned about the point of pur-

chase, and any scheme to equali.e freight costa would, be
superfluous.

Second. the industriesarEt usually characterized by a
high degree of geographic concentration. ot production and a
l1m1ted number of producera. 3 Thi. characteristic 18 moat
eal117 •• en in the steel industry.
18 located at the lource

or

Bere, productive capacity

one ot the raw material. rather

than at the px-inclpal market outlet..

!beet'fect ot thla

tl"Pe of locat1onal patternls to createareaa where much more
1. The term "delivered pr1c1ns" wl11be us.d interchangeabl,.
with "baaing pointprlcingtf , throughout th1. paper. Aetua.lly
"delivered pricing" 1. a broader term and 1n.clude. toning
and national unitol'11.1 salea price 80hemes 8.. well as the
baaing point method. Moat writers on th. baaing po1nta7.t •• ,
however, use the term a8 a 8}'nonym to baaing point pricing.
2. DUdleyF t Pe gl'Um I- The Re ;relet ion or Indu8trz. ( Chicago, 1949) ,
p. 115.
3. Ibid., p. 116.·

ot .tbe products.. prot\uce4tbancan becOft.ume4 !nth. market
1mmed1at.17aur'l"Oundlng theproduct1on point.;

The t..tng

po' 1nt;met'bod '" allowl the highl,. concentx-a ted, production center.
i

to meet prev8,111ng prices 11') more distant marketare••• 1
Th1:rd., the total demand for the product 1s u.Buallycom-"
paratlvel,. inelastic tX-Oma price

'8tandp~1n~. wh1~ethemar

ket1.s such that the potential demand tor the 1nd1vudual pro ..
ducer'apltoduct 18 b1,gbl,. elaatlc.' This mean. that in the

ab••nce otcontrol. the market ,might very well. be comparatively competitive .ere it not tor trelgbtd1tterencea,whlch
!n lom,a cases may be erfecitve barriers to widespread c()mp••

titian.
Fourth, the 1ndu.tr1es have "comparatively high r1za4

coata •.S This means that there 11 constant pre.sure on the
1ndlv1due.l to expand his own output...

Alao atud1es inth.

ste-el induatlT baveshown that variable coat. remain constant
over a ra1Jher wide range of output. 4 'This means that the
average cost per unltde.elln•• 'Until

has been reached..

8.

large output le·vel

Thus, the indivSdual producer 11 a,lwa,..

atrlv1n'! tor enough marketoutleta to allow h:tm to produce
near capacltr_

The basing point. s7"tem allow. the individual

producer to expand 8.1ea cn a geographic basis w:lthout up.

setting th, prlce structure ot the lOCQ.l market.

8

F1inal17. use of tbebl48,1n,g point system require. some
organ1zQ,t1on witbin tb,e indus.tryusing it.

This gives ,ri••

to t'he lastcharacter1st1c of industries using this pricing

method, i.e., concentration of power within the industry e1t,her
through th,emed,1um

or

price leadex-sh1p.

It bas been argued that industries using

dominating firma, traci. associations. or

the basing poin,t 87stem are of the type which would ordinarily
'"

,','

,

have an administered price in any case.

1

OPERA,TIOW

Ind1apenaableto the opera,t1on of any delivered pricing
system, 18 publication of the various base priceaby the pre, viously desigtated btu,ing points.

In the steel industry,

th1s was done by the Iron and steel Institute.

Equipped with

this information, the indlv:1dual producer finds it rela.tivel,.

simple to compute the delivered price to an7 possible destina-

tion.
8.

In order to faoilitate computation of delivered prices,

rate book is usually publisbed in conjunction with the baae

prices.

These ra.tes mayor may not coincide with the actual

freight rates.

When railroad

frel~t

rates change, the old

rat!e book is usually" used until such time as a ne" one can be
computed. 2 Although the s7stem is extremelY' easy to use, it 1.
very precis8 1 and 1n at least one case, it has been shown tba.t

prices submitted by cement produ.cers on a government order

were preciselY' the same to five dec1malplaces.:5
.- _d

1. Fortune, xxxix (1949), p. 211.
2. laefllup, ~. cit., pp. 20..1.
3. Ibid •• p.-rr. -

x••'pinathe. participants tn line Is

6\

comparativel,.

a1mplepl'ocedurt.1t one of tbeproducers quotes. p1'1ce
which 18 not1n. l1new1th the pr1ee.whieh WQU14
useot the pricing formula. the

r~8ultrrom

o1?ber members· can retal1ate:

b'1makingth1s producerts mIll an involuntary basing
with a ·very low ba.S9 px*1ce.

PO~¥)t.

This means that sales in this

proQ,ucer's area will be made on the basis ot a base price
which may not eveneover cO$t..The: other members ean d1••

vide the btu.ine"e .in thiaarea in such away Illtosutfer
only very slightly trom the' 'artificially low price.

a

shortp.~10d

Atte,r

of thIs, the recalcitrant produ.cer u8ual1,.

This practioe 18 known tOMV. been successtully
used inet l.ea.st on,. 1natance. 1 It should, be pointed OU:tl
conforms.

however, that resort to a ct,10l'l

or

this sort 18 very rare

sin.ce aa a rule members of the .,-at•• contormbeeauae it
1& to theiradvanta,g8 to doe'c.

tion,

ot

This simplicit,. in opera-

the 'bcts1ng point system should not be conftu,ed with

the vastl., mo.re complicated result..

The basing point syate.

bas been called the" ••• most intricately contusing phenomenon

or

modern cap1tallsm.,,2

MEOfJANIOS
In order to determine what lome of the posa1ble1mp11.

cationl of the.bbllt1on of the basing poin,.t .,..'Cam might be,

It 1s t:trst necessary to de·flneprec1sely what the Iystem is,
III

-

•

1. cr. ?loyd Bond, tfEconomlcand Legal Dnp11oa.tiona of the
cement Decision.," Pr'oeeedinS8 of the TWenn-thlrd A.nnual
conference or 'the pacifIe Coast Economic IS8oc!i~!on. •
{to ..

Angelea, 1'948)

2. Fortun., xxxix (1949), p.211.

10

and what some ot itl ef.fects bave been.

It II for this pur-

pose that the following discussion 1s includ.ed.
;The singl.e basing point system was the first to be 'used
in this country and 1s thea1mplest type of de11veredp:ricing
scheme.

This system exists wherl tbe sellers of apartlcular

product figure freight charges on their product from one particular product figure freight charges on. their product from

one particular mill or city.

Thu8,for example, it there are

eeveral widelY' acatteredmil1s producing identical ot' nea.rly
identical product. and all the mills chal-ge freight on their

shipments 8a i f all shipments had originated at one certa.1n
m111among them, this constitutes pricing by the 8in.gle base

method.

The single base method is important only from the

standpoint o·f historical development.

It was the first step

in the evolution of the modern basing point. syatems. 1

The multiple basin.g point system 1s the type most .1001,.
used :in recent years. 2 This method of delivered pricing is not
so simple or readily understandable as the single base method.

It exists where the sellers of

8

particular px-oduct figure

freight charges on their salcs from a group of previously
designatedm111s or cities.

The multiple-base system differs

from the single base system only as regards the number ot
points de81gnatedQs bases or basing points.

The rule under

nlultiple basinG point priein,g is that of the various combina-

tions between base prices and freight coats, the one resulting

1. Ma cblup" 02,2. Ibid.

-

ill-,

pp. 1'7-20.

11

in the 10w6at de11veredprlce, 1. selected ,b}r each seller .e

governing baa. for his, price quotation.

the applicable

O~

(See fig. 1).

This usually

m~flns

that tb,seller will com-

bine the ba.se price and fr-.lghtcos'ta of the nearest basing
point to thebuyerlncomput1ng his price.

This would. be

the case unless the base price ot the'l'leareat base point was
high enough to more than a,treat freight chargee from a more

distant base point.

(Set) fig. 2).

Since all them111ssel1to an,. consuming point as it
the

p~od.uct

had been shipped from the bas\1,ng point whose

base price plu8 fre'1ght made the lowest aa1e price, mill

net or actual amount rece1v3d by the producer after t'rel.ght
baa been· considered. will vary according to the proximity

ot the seller to the buyer in terms

or

freight.

If the seller

18 in a leas fortunateposltion treight-w1s9 than 1s the
governing baaing point. he 1s said to beat a. freight disad-

vantage and must resort to freight
sale.

(See tig. 3).

abso~pt1on

to m8.ke his

If,. on the other band, he 18 in a

comparatively better pOllt1on f'reight-wlseto the buyer than
1e the governing basing point, he bas what i8 termed. a freight

advantage and lathe recipient of phantom f'relght, or pa,-ment
for freight charges which do not exist.

(see f1g. 4).

Since

freight is nearly always figured on the basis or rail ship-

ment costa, a seller may be ata freight advs.ntageand reoeive
phantoM freight if there 1s 80me alternative cheaper method
(for example wQ,ter transportation) of shipping hiB product to

t,he b\.1'7er.

One of the mo,.,t important ouigrowtba ot de11varedpr1c"
inS 1athe pract1ceot market penetration..

Since all milla

use theba8ing point which results in the lowest delivered

price to

flOj"

particular buyer, it 18 possible for them to

compete in any market, re.gardless of how far it is from

their plant.

l.'hus. 1n figure 1, even though A is the logical

supplier of the market X, and can supply this market and. realjze a higher mill netl'riee than, can the other planta1nth1a

diagram. the other p,lenta can and do sell at X at the s'ame
delivered price as quoted by A eventbough they realize lower
mill nets on their sales.

"!larket penetration, oceu!1'S con-

,sts,nt17 because most of the larger producers (o.fsteel) in

order to operate at

8.

low unit cost compete 1n all of the

rr.ajor markets for the products the,. make.

Consequently.

while one mill sells for deliver,- at points nearer to other
mills, it finds that more distant mills a.re making sales

for delivery interritor1es n.earer to 1t.,,1 These shipments
have been called "cross hauling. 1t

It is suggested that tbis

term be g1vena more definite meaning# and confined to ship-

ments of identical -products which occur at about the same
time. 2 (See t.1g .• 5).
Ordinarily, the natural market territory of any producer

1s thoueht ot as the territory in which this particular seller
can make sales at a lower price than can any other seller or
the same product..

1. T .1t .E. c.
2, }:b1d.

It is read11r apparent

J\~ono grapb

42, PI'. 3-4·6.

t~..at

this could not

be the cas. under a 8ystem of delivered pricing,

When eve1'7

seller queto. the same price to oveX'J' bUJ"fJl' as 18 quoted b7

every other seller, regardless ot

dlst,QllCS f:rom tbe buyer,

the oldeoncept. of the natural market territory is no longer

valid.

Thus, the natural mB.l"ket territory

ot a seller

111 a

basing po:1nt system 1sdetinedaa that a.rea in which the mill

can use a delivered price calculated

011.

the basis of its own

base price plus the aetual freight to the POlllt of consump.
(see .fig. 6). Tho' mill has a competitive advantaee

tion.

in selling 1b its

own natural :market territory, but it must

absorb trelghtin. order to roo.ke sales 1n the natural market
torritory of any athol" bassm!ll.

ThIs means that when the

mill salls 1n some othor m111ts nat'Ural llm.r1!otterl"'itory it

mustrece1ve a smaller mill net return t'han tt.w.t D:lQde on
snles in its own territory"_

The existence of

Ii

(see fig. 7).

non-bas,e mill does not alter the

.

: ' •••

na turn 1

tr'~rket

area underth& bas lrji! po in t system

$

incein

no case are prices ever computed on 'bhe basis of a non-base

mill. (Soe fig. 6).

J .......

. ..
-....
....
..
. ..
. .. .
--

dra8A'.~·

~

~.

In this case" the newba.se mill ha.s

ltsown market ares. and tho old basing POUlts must nOVi compute pr1ces to consumers

ir~

this area on the basls of the

new poitlt fa base prlce and freight costs.
The above discussion of the n16chan.icB of' the basing

)

••• e •

..,

ticall,.. (SGe rig. 8)..

. . . . . 41

........'. ....-.
.....
,-.. .... - ..

If '. however, the non-base mill becomes .: •••

a. basing point, .tho natural market structure is altered

•

••• v....

14

po:t.nt 17.tem and the accompanying diagramepreaen'b only a
ver,. brief and incomplete picture.

In the op1n1on

o~

the

writer, theae illustrations do, however, contain tho 8ssent1ala
of the Bystom.
A discusalon ot "extra." haa been de11be·rate1l omitted

trom tn.ducue.ion 1n order to 81mplUy 1t.

"Extras" are

amount. added to, or deducted troll. the base pr1Qe. announced
for produ.ct

OlaS8.fUI

1n order to take care of the part1cular

bU1er'a8pecifications of size, speoial qua,lltr. special treat-

ment, or Quant1ty.l Prices quoted for de11.ver:y at given d •• tinat1ona, whlch include "extra.". are called net delivered
price...

Omlaa1onof "extras" from the above discussion in no

way 1nval:1datea the discus.ion.

.. d

<

I

1. T.:N.E.C. N.onograph. 42. p. 40.

TV

Note: The following eight diagrams were either taken directly
from, or inspired by, those appearing in T.N.E.C. Monograph
No. 42, pp. 33-40.

THE BASING POINT METHOD
Figure 1: Determination of the governing base under a multiple
base system.
The basing point at A is governing for sales to the consumer
at X. The other basing points would have to compute prices
on this base. _
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THE BASING POINT METHOD
Figure 2: Illustration of case where nearest base
point is not the governing base.
Both A and B are governing bases to consumer
Only A, however, governs to consumer Y, even
is further from Y than is B. This is because
higher base price at B.

to consuming

X.
though A
of the

FIGURE 2

....,
m

THE BASING POINT METHOD
Figure 3: Illustration of freight disadvantage and freight
absorption.
Mills at B and C are at a freight disadvantage to consumer
at X as compared with mill at A. To make sales at I, they
must absorb freight.
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THE BASING POINT METHOD

Figure 4: Illustration of freight advantage or phantom freight.
Mill at A has lowest base price plus freight to x.
Mill at c charges the same delivered price. Having a
freight advantage of $1 over A, c realizes a mill net
$1 higher than A. This $1 is phantom freight. Note
that mill c is a non-base mill.
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THE BASING POINT METHOD
Figure 5: Illustration of cross-hauli..ng.
Products shipped from A to Y go past products shipped
from B to X. This involves cross-hauling only if:
1. The products shipped are identical.
2. Shipments occur substantlally at the same time.
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THE BASING POINT

~lETHOD

Figure 6: Illustration of natural market territory under the basing
point system.
Mills at basing points A and B realize full base prices
on sales in their respective natural market territories
as described by the boundary 0-0. Non-basing point mill
at c has no base price and meets the delivered prices of
A and B when it sells in thebr respective natural market
territories. _.~~dc.onf~.I.~?.
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THE BASING POINT METHOD
Figure 7: Illustration of how shi.pping beyond boundary of natural
market territo~ reduces mill net.
When mill B sells to X, its mill net is $ho.
When mill B sells to Y, its mill net is only ~37.
1. Freight is $2 higher.
2. Delivered price is $.l lower.
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THE BASING POINT METHOD

Figure 8: Illustration of the effect of naming a new basing point.
After C becomes a basing point, the boundary 0-0 that lies
between A and B ceases to be significant. Mill at C then
has a natural market territory bounded by N-N and Nf_Nt,
:tn which it establishes lower delivered prices than A or
B. To sell :tn this terri tory, mills at bas:i.ng points A
and B must now ~bsorb freight.
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the baling po1nt
und.•r the Sherman Act,

suS,.

Commi•• 1on Act.

.,..t....,.

be, attaoked 11'1 the court.

~h.·O~7ton

Act,or the Federa.l Trade

baa.)l"Jlbrough' under all thX'•• of the ••

18...81100•••·1\11 proseclttion,. however, baa r ••ulted C)n1.7 under
tile Clayton and Federal

Tr..ti:eCOll8l1as1on Acta.

Thetollowing 1s a ll.tb':Ot the pos.ible legal pl'ovl$iol'la

underwhlchtht government could ask the courts to condemn the
baaU1spotnt878tem a8 uaedcollect1ve1l by an industry_

As

atated above, 8ucc•••,fulpro•• cutionba. resulted O·n17 in ease,

based upon thoBe portions of the Cla7ton Act. and the Federal
Trade comm,t88ion Act, wblch.re llsted be·low.
1. If

tn.

system

ar1s8. a8 a result of agr••ment. whose exiat-

ence mal' be proved d1rectlyor interred from their etteets.

(Sherman Act, Sec. 1)

s.

It the .,.stem 18 maintained b1 oompeting sellers who are

aware that concerted act10nb oontemplated and invited.
(Sherman Aot, Sec. 1)

I,. It the 8'Tatemenable. • larger 1rm to impose lta price
policy on the smaller th-ma 1n t'he induatr7and Ie thu8 a par'

of an attempt to monopollze.

(Sherman Act, Sec. 2)

4. It the .,...tem 18 the result of agreement. designed to avoid
price competition.

(Federal Trade Commission Act. Sec. 5)

5. It the system 18 main.t·a1ned by competing seller. tollow.1ng
a commoneour8.
competition.

ot aotion which results

in a l1mitation of price

(Federal Trade COmmission Act, Sec. 5)

24

6. It it cone'tltutes conscious parallel action resultin.g in
a 1 1lnlt.at10.n of prlcecompet1t1on.
Act,

S.~.

(Federal Trad,G commis8ion

5)

'1. If members of the system are guilty of charging different

prices to different bU7ers,not just.1.f1ed on the basis of cost.
Thleeonstltutes a lessening of competition, and price discrimination.

(Clayton Act, Sec. 2,

$8

S.mended by the

Robin·son-

Patman Act)

8. If' the charging of difterent prices to different buyers 1s
no.t ju.stif1ed on the bas1sof eost and imposes upon small competitorssubstantial reductions in income, jeopardizing the
eont1nuanceof effective competition by these sellers ana. constituting price discr1mination. (Clayton Aet. Sec. 2, as amendad)

9. If charging different prices to different buyers not just 1-

tied on the basis of cost causes substantial differences in the
profit ms.rgin ot the buyers of the produot which may effectively

reduce competition.

(Clayton Act. Sec. 2. as amended)

10. If the syatemCllnnot be just1fied as e. method ot meeting
lower pr1ceso.f a competitor in good faith, because systematic
dlscr1minat1on which eliminates or reducescompet1t1on cannot

at the aame t1mebe a meeting of competItion in good faith.
(Clayton Act.. Sec. 2, as amended) 1
It has ta.ken a total of 25 court cases and decisions to

reach the conclusion finally a.rrivedat in the Cement case.

1. 1.JIachlup,02_cit •• PP.· 42.a.

8S

The adjudication began tn. 1910 t and. has extended ttJ;)date.
The crueial

lSSU88

1n d,.aiding the qu.estion of the legal1t,.

of the basing point system were (1) wbether the system was
based on oollusive orconcerteCl action 1n restra1r.tt of competition and (a).hather it involved. price discrimination
1nJurlous to compot1t10n. 1
There follows a br1ef history of 81gn1fl.cant court decisions as the1 have developed through the yea.X's •

These cases

have been divided into industries because this method

or

pre-

senting themeeems most logical.

STEEL
The first large scale us. ot delivered pricing was the
P.1ttsbu.rgh-plu8 system which was u8edin the steel 1ndustr7
from about 1909 until 1921.

In 1921, the ChIcago producers.

8ufter1ngtrom unused capacity. broke awa,-from the Pittsburgh
base and began quoting their Bales on a Chicago base.

This

same year. the Federal Trade COmmission, after receiving man,.
oomplaints from the western steel consumers. began an1nvestlgat10n which ultimated in a complaint a.ga1nst the United

states Steel corporation.
In duly) 1924. tbe Federal Trade Commission issued an

order to the Corporation and lt88ubsidiaz-1es to oease and
desist from the Pittsburgh-plus pra.ctice.

The order spec1f-

icall,..tated that prices were to be based on the cost at
the ml11plua freight (actual) to the point ot destination •
•

j l -.

S6

(ThIs would be true t.o.b.m.l11 prioing.)

The efrect otthe

oN:er •• 8 not the abandonme:ttt of the basing point 81'It"DI,
but s.btp1r the changing of the _1ltem b7 inC?reas:lng the num-

ber of basins po1ntatrom .s!ngleto a multiple ba.se plan.
This bad the effect 01 brin.gb1gsharp reductions 1nprlc••

weat of Chicago and the We'. tern consumers ..ere •• tist!ed
tor the time.

The Federal Trade commission'. order applied

onl,. to the United stat •• steel Corpora.t1onand ita subsidiaries"

80

a large portion ot the steel industry remained

under the old lJ'atem.

In spite of the tact that the order

was openly violated,l no further attempts were made to enforce it.

EVen the announcement of new bas1ng points pro-

ceeded only verra1owly.

For several 7••1:'S, the only effect

of the orde.r was an increa.ehl the number

or

mills desig-

nated as basing po1nt8.!
W1th" theooming ot the great depree.lon in the 19Sa l a,

tbere developed Bomeopen p:rlce compet1t1on in the sale
price of steel.

This outbreak ot price compet it 10n was

stopped through the use of governmental power delegated to
the large steel producers on the tbeoryotlndustr1al selt-

government under the National Indu8tr1al Recovery Act of
1933.

!'he regulations ot the N.R.• A.

Code

ot Fair Gompeti-

tion restored the rule of the bas1nS point sy.tam. and
probab17 made it more absolute than :it had been before.
1. »a.. ChlU:P,01i, q1.t •• p. 67.
2. Ib14., P ••. ~ ' .

-

All the rule ...blch hat! been .eer.,t a.nd voluntar7 now beClllle

publlcandco.p111Bor,..

The baaing point 8,.8t'em was enforced

'b7 . .ana of prohibitive fines.

When the _.I.A • •as declared

un,constitutional in 1935. antlthe pe,r1odot .elf government

, ,o,t industry was ended, thepr1e1ng practice in the steel in..
duatr7 continued undisturbed.

T'he appa.ratu,s of price control.

no longor legalized, bad to go underground.

There is evidence

that the rulesotthe N.R.A, code not only continued in effect,
but were amslldedand supplemented a.fterits dissolution. 1
In March, 1938, an •.mendment to the Fedel'al Trade Com..

mission Act.prov,1ded that every order of the. Commission

should. become :final, and its violat1on. punishable, unless

a petItion tor revlew

"'8,8,-

filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals.

This new prov1sion of the la.forced thetrn1tedStatos steel
corporation to f11e • Pet1tlontor Review in MaY', 1938,a8k1ng
the COurt to .et aside the 1924 order ot the Federal Trade comm'usion.Helther the commia e lOll nor tbe corporation .ere.nx..

10us to preas the ease., however. and l1ttle action wae taken.
A.t this time, the Commission bad begun its cas. agamat the

aement Institute, and it seemed likely thatth1a case would

provide the basis tor aettlem.nt of the Steel caae. 2
The war agaSn postponed. action, and in 1946, 'the United

states steel corporation tiled a "Petition for a Clar1flca.tlon

1. Machlup, .2R.. cIt., p.

a9 IC.ft.

Daughert,. •. M.G. d.eChazeau,
8.8. Hrai'ron,TheEconomiesof the. Steel1!l!it1strl,
a vol. (New York. 19S'1), p. to9S.
2. Us. chlup. .22.. c1~., p. 71.
and

aa
ot 1#13.. Ord:•• under Review."
to mod1t7 the
•

fl• .,

tlon.,

The eorpo:ration .sked the Ooto.-'

order ottbe "'ederal :Trade COmmuI1on in auch

aa tool1m1nate the prohibition a_lrl.t freight abaorp-

The answer to this ctlIne1n the form ot the Cement 'DeciIl\. 1947, the comm1as1on issued a

sion hAnded down1n 1948.

Compla1ntaga1natthe American h-on and Steel Inatltut. and
101 firms in the steel

1nduatr,.~

f1rmswlth bav.1ng 1'0110".'.

".~.a

The Complaint charged the

common andcooperatlve

course ot aetion 1n their •• ··.use of baa1ngpo1nt

practlce.~tt

Tbe1ndultry did not give up ita legal battle.ltb the Fed-

eral Trade Commission, end continued to ins1st bef'orethe

commission a8 well •• before the court, that it. 'baaing

point ."stem .a. laWfUl.

At the same time, how.ver t it die·

continued using thebas.ingpo1nt .,ltem (Ju17. 1949) and

started .ell1ng steel on an f.o.b. m111 basis.

It explained.

th1a actlonby po.1nting to the tact that the system bad been
declared illegal.

This decision by the Iteel hlduatl'J' to abandon the baains
po1nt.sy8tem ..... apparentl,. part of a grand strategy tor taking
the ca •• to oongress to obtain apecisll leg181atlon. 1 The method
chosen served to raise steel price. and thU.8 to create a demand

for return of thetleheapertt baaing' point s7stem.

If the tran-

sition trom the bas·1ng po1nt system to u1l1formf.o.b. mill

pricing were to be made without increasins the average mill
net price, this averagem:l.l1nat price would have to become

29

the uniform t .o.b. mill price.
at

lit hlgbellou~

Base prices are u,\tall,. set

levelt;Q a.llow for freig)'ltabsorpt1an,.

To,

eet the t,.o. b. mill price. instead., a t the level of the tormer base price was to ralse!)r1cee qu1tedellberately and

was by no means a necessary consequence of the transition
to the uniform i.a.b. mill pricing formula.Thi8 prioe in...

;creas8, was made pOS8ible by the cOl1lb1nation ot the cost in-

creasea and the excel,S 6.f d.emandover e.x1sting eapaci,t,. 1n
the earl7

p08t~war

era, as well as bye high state of organ!-

=at1on within the industry.

Most observers agree that this

priee increase wa,acontemplated whether the basing points,s-

tem was abandoned or not.

It offered an excellent opportunity

to put the ne. f.o.b. mill pricing 87atem in an unfavorable
11g:ht at the outset.

Combined with the price increase, were

the ditf1oult·les orad.justing to a new pricing ayetem,.&s

well

al

threat,. on the part of steel producers tha.t reloca-

tion of plants to CO.nform with the new pricing system would
be very costly and. would further raise pr1ces.

These and

a:im11ar items were used bY' the steel j..nduatry to put the
new syste.m at

Q

disadvantage w1 th the public from the start.
c

The management of steal makes no secret of its desire to re ..

turn to the old, mope controllable system.

It is at present

doin,geveryth:ing in its power to brin.g about this &00. 1
, d

1. Norman FOY,e "The 6ssentialsof the Steel Producers Right
to Compete ," ne f lvered prieinsand the FUture ot Anle:riean
BusinesaJ'i The Econom1c InstItute 0/ the'UntEea 'states
,i~Iam'6er of Co1l1l!!arce,( Wa abington,. 1948) ,pp. 127.. 135.

court action aga inat' the use of bas ing point pr1c1ns U1
the cement induatr7wasbegun 1n 1923.

The District Court

decided that there was ,unlawful combination in restraint of

trade 1n the industry.

Tllftt cement producers under the lead-

ership oltha cement ABsoc1atlon appealed the esse to the
Supreme Court.

In their case, the cement producers tried to

prove that uniform delivered prices were a natural result of
In the words of ,the Court: "A great

perfect oompetition.
volume

or

testimony

W8..S

also given. by distinguished 'eoonomists

in support of the thesis that :\n the case of a standardized

product sold wholesale to ful17 informed buyers, a.s were the
dealers in cement, uniformity of price will inevitably result

trom act1ve, free, and unrestrained compet1t1on. n1 The court
was peraua,ded by this argument.

It wa.s thus that 1n 1925 the

multiple ba.s1ng point system in the cement industry was, in
effect, .sanctioned b,.. the supreme court ..
There seems to be but little doubt that price competition
was absent in the cement industry since the baf!Je prices rama.ined unchanged fro.m January, 1933, to June, 19:38.

Also, the in-

dus try was brought together by mergers so tha thy 1937 the
five largest firms in the industry controlled over 39 per cent

or

the tota leap. e1 tr-

1. Cement Manufacturer's 'Protective Association v. United
States, t!liau.s. 588, !05, 606 (1915). AlSO 1'01' a sImilar
sta£ement made by the representatives otthe steel il'ldustr7
see: T.N.E.C. Monograph 42, p. 52.

In 1937, the Fed.ral Trade COmmi.sion i8sued

Ii

COmplaint

againat the cement Institute, and 74 cement companies.

The

proceed1ngs 1n this ease included testhnGllY as to the facta
as wella8 the economic issues involved, and a large number

of academic economists were called as exp'ert witnesses.
Finall., in Jul,. " 1943, the Commisaion issued a Cea8e-and-

Desist Order.

The Oement Institute s,nd the compan1ea appealed

to the courts.

The first decision was banded down by the

CireultCOurtof Appeals in 1946. 1 This decision set aside

the order by the Federal TradeCommls81on and in effect aane ..,
tloned the use of multiple basing point pricing.

TheFederal

Trade COllllnisaion appealed this decision to the Supreme court
of tbe Un1ted5tates, whicb 1n 1948 set a.ide the decision of

the lower,couztt and upbeld thecommi88 ion • s order by a 6ta 1
1ilajor1ty.2
The Federa,lTrade COmmission's order was upbeld by the

supreme Court on two count..

The first

W&.8

that the basing

point system, as used by the cement industry, was unfair competition .in v1olation of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

The second was that the indultr1'suse of tbe system conatl.
tuted systematic price d1scr1mina.t1on injurious to competition
in violation

ot

patman Act;.-

The court rejected th.e contention that price

the clayton Act .a amended by ,theR.ob1nso.n-

d18cr1m1nat1on inherent in .s7stema.t1c treie}ltabeorption 18

s..

1. Aetna portland Cement Companl v. Federal Trade Commis.ion,

324 U.
7ae (lOIS J•
683 t nliS)tB s.:cl;p.70S. ...

·

r

2. Federal Trade Oommiss1on v. Tho cement Instltute) 353 U.S.

.

.

....

I

lawful

'UI

apr1ce reduction, -made in good faith to meet

an equally low price of acompet1tor.,,1 Tb1s provUlon of

the Robinaon-Patman Act beara, Qceordin.g to the court. onl:r
on

tf ••• 1nd1v1d:ualcompetltlve

situations, rather tha.n upon

a general system of competition. ttl

As was the.CItse 1n the steel industry, the cement· industry used the.

t~an81tlon

from basine point to t.o.b. mill pric-

ing as an excuse tor raising prIces.

This was possible :1n ce·

ment" as in steel. because. at the 8ltisttn.g prices, demand had
been1n excelsot the existing capacity of the 1nduatry.

At

pre.sent, the cement industry is a lao making eyery effort to
3
return to basing point pricing.
CORB PRODtT eTa

The corn products or corn. derivatives industry- 1s concernad. with the production of such things a.a oorn syruP. glucose,
corn sugars, dextrin., starches, and corno11s.Corn syrup

is the chief sweetening ingredient in. nearly all sorts ot
candy and is also w1<1817 used in. j8111e.1 and jams.

Col'npro-

ducts are a180 foun·d 1nbaby'a formula, cannedfrult,bread,
book b1nd:lngs, eoap, and numerous other a.rt1eles found in

eve17da" use in almost an,. household.
The corn product,indu8try was quite competitive !nthe
beginning, but it eventually became consolidated into the

1. Language of Section 2b of the Robinson-patman Act. If' this
can be proved. prosecution 1s not possible.
2. From the majority opinion in the cement case sited above.
3. Machlup,02- !!.t-; p •. S3.
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handa of a few produ.oer.8 tbr,OU(.:h a system of m,ergera ..The
mergers were deelaredto be tlle galln part, Bothe in.d'Q.str1
resorted to trade associations to condu.ct its 91'1oe poliey •.
The f1:rst scheme used. was a single basing point system with
all

prlces1ssu~d

on n Chicago, 'base,

This was abandoned atter

at1me, and atntllt1ple basing point systemoomb1ned with zone
pricjngwaa adopted. a
The Federal

TradeO!l~leslon

issued a Cesee-an<l-Des!st

or(ier to two of the firms in the industry in 19:59, 1939.

The

prod\lcersap:?ealed to the courts for relief from these orders,
and

jrl

sians.

April, 1945. the Supreme

CO~lrt

The f1rstof these decisions

is called the Com Products Case.
of the company were located in
ba.sed on de11ve.ry from Chica.go.
ducts of this company

lU3:re

handed down two dec1.
WQS

handed down in.hat

In this cQse,the t>lants

Y~nsas

city and. prices were

Chlef consumers o.t the pro-

candy 'producers.

the companyfs price policy was tog1ve

8

The ef·rect of

competitive advan-

tage to the producers located at Chicago as against those
located closer to the· plantae

The Supreme Court found that

the differences in price eould n.ot be Juet1fiedby differences
in cost such as would ha'Je made them lawful undex- the Clayton

1. Ibid., p. 94. By 1906 the Corn Products Refining COmpan7
conirolled 100% of the production of glucose •. The National
starch Vanutacturing Company oontrolled 80~ of the starch
production 1n the United sta tee.
2. tpid., p. 86. Packaged goods were sold bY' zones end bulk
goods were sold on 4l. basins point arrangement.

Aot as amended.

The Supreme Court u.pheld the order otthe

Commiaalon. 1

The .econd ot the •• 48c1l10n. wa. hand.td down 1n wbat
18 called the St.l.7ca •.••,8TbeSt.187 plant was lo,cated Sn

l)tcatur, Illinois and it too· based. it.• prioes on a deliveredfrom-Chicago b•• lI.

T'hedtaor1m1nat1on and1njury arls1ng

fro. this prioing practico.a. much the .ame .a that 1n the

corn Products Clu,e.

stale,.,· bowever i offered the deien.••

that .1ta price policy was directed at meeting the prioes set

by

corn

Products.

The court said. that " ••• the COmmissionts

conclu.lon a"ems inescapable that respond.ent'. disc!'1m1na-

tiona, such as those between purcbaser81n Chicago and
Decatu~,

were o8ta.bl1ahed not to meet equal17 low Obicago

price. ot competitors there. but 1n order to establish 81•••
"here the art1ticial17 hlghpr1c•• whos. d1acrltnlna.to17 etrect

permeatel r •• pondenta entire pricing sY8tem." A8 a re.ult of
tb. above named decisiona, tour trade as.8oe1atlon8 whieh bad

pertormed servlce. helptul in ensuring observance of the
baaingpolnt rule ....ere dissolved 1n september ot 1946.
The l'eaeral Trad.e commi•• lon found it naolu.8arTin June,
1947, to proceed with a new complaint aga1n<lt 19ttrms comprising about 95 per cent of the1ndultl"7_

Among the tirma

are the two who lost their cases before the $u·preme Oourt in
•.

J

1. cornprQduc.tfJRet1ninsqo:nentv. Fedel'all'z-a.de Comm18,a1on,

SUi T.l'. S• '1D! (!giS) •

2. Federal Tra.de . Comm 1s81on.v.,. &.E •.. stalel Hanutaetu.rms
~anl' 32'1 13'.3. 146 {niS).

22m.

3.orwin D'. Ed...rds, "The Efrect of the Recent Basing point
Decisions upon Buaine •• practioe.,-The American Economio
Review. xxxviii (1948), p. 830.
I
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the above de Ci8lon. .'fheoommlls1oneharge. that tbe induet1'7 18 .tlll .t1aing price.' on a Chicago
1ngin othercollu8ive practice..

'ba..

as •• 11 ..1ndulg-

This complaint 18 still :In

the courts at thet1:me ot th1a writing, bUt it the comml•• 1on
1. upheld, the corn PrOducts and Stale,. cases w111 beyiewed
a8 apee1al ca8es :In an. induatr,--.wide collusive plan.l

STEEtCO}lDUIT

The Federal '!'rad. Commission 1asued a Cea •• -and ...nes181';
order both. Rlgid Steel Conduit Aa,aociat1onln connection

with their priem.g practice.

In this

caStl.

the Commission

tound not onl,. that the produoerll had conspired to adhere' to
a priemg plan, but a1ao that eacb individual producer had

adopted the ba.1ngpo1nt .,..tem1ntbe lmowledgetbat the
others ..ere doing 11kewise.

Th1a aotion oonstitute. illegal

el1:m1natlon 1n vlolatlon of the Federal Trade ·00:mm1881oo Act.·
The ASloCiation appealed tbis order to tnecour'b..

The Circuit

courtot Appeals upbeld the Commisalon's order and the Association appea.led thctcase totheSUpl'flme court.

In APril, 19,9,

the supl'em. court b7 fl " to 4 de 018 ion uphe 1d tbe d.ecl. ion ot
the lower court. 3 This case "as viewed as beingeapec1a.117

11gn1tl.cant since 1t wal. 1n .trect, a test ot strength tor
the cement Dec1.,lon.

b ..

1. Ibld.. p. 831.
2. lD'lCY•• p. 835.
3. 'lYiOFsel. Feldman, "Baaing pointaand the 0 '.ahoner B111,"
Fortupew,f· x.l( 1949 1,PP. 14:'7-8.

PR0BlSLEIEGAL BTl. TUB
In .al1 the above ••• a, the Court and the Oommission

have baaed •. 11 their dee1a lon. upon the existene,e ofa con-

spiraar to f:J.x prices,somettme.accompanied. bJt a oonapirac7
to restrict competition Sn other way..

The Commiaalon'. Pl'O-

c••dings bavenot been directed against the baa1ng point ays.
temper •• , but apinatconapiracJ' or collusion resulting hl
price d1acr1m1natlQnwhlc.h, 1n
price competition.

1,~8

turn, 11 a departure trait

Thll hal created avast amount of speen-

latlonon the part of aca.demic economists, government employees, and bueines.men

.a

to the exact legalatatue of the

basing point practice.
In tho hope ot clar1fJ"1ng the isau, aomewhat, the

Temporal?' National Economic Committee made the following state..

ment in 1941.
"EXtensive hear1ngs on baaing point systems aholf
that the., are u~.d 1n many mdustries as an etteot1vedevlc'o tor el1m1nat1ngprlce competItion •••
The el1mlnat10tl of suoh systems under ex.1st1ng
law would involve a costly process of prosecuting
aeparatell and individually _ny industries,; and
place a heavy burden upon antitrust enforcement
appropriation ••• Wetheretore reoommend that the
Consresa enact legislation declaring 8ucb pricing
818tema to be illegal."
Conge •• took no 8.ctlon on the

T.~J.E.,C.

recommendation at the

time because the war had begun 1n Europe and Congress was

bU8,. witb detense preparations •
•" n

Atter thec••ant ».01,lon in .Aprl1, 1948, clar1tlcatrlon

of the 18_1 atatul of b.aing po.1nt prlcing .,-atamlae,.ea to

become apresaSngneed.specula,tlon .a to· the 1mpllcat1ons

ot th1a decislon hal app ••rea on al1e1del, andha8 been
extremel,. varied.

Juetice Black ot the 8upremeOourtmade

... tat.ment impl.,1ng tbatthe cement Deoision would make
baalrls point pricing illegal 1n nearlJ' all eastus,

Mr,Lo1rel1

Mason or the F.T.C. echoed this sent1ment wbenhe said. "I
believe that a.n individual del1ver$d price .ystem i.out,

I

believe that freight absorption 18 out. I believe zone price.
are out.- 1 On the other side of the, argument 1s the statement

of Mr. Robert Freel', Oha1rm.a.n ot the Federal Trade Commie81onl
"Now 1n the light of that· ana17lia, I would just
like to otter two conclusions tor you. The first
18 that basingpo1nt and dellvered price 178tema,
as Su.ch, are under no sp.c1al atta>ck. In prooeeding aga1:nst collusive price tixing. and injuriouS

dlacr1m1nat1oll. the Oommuslon has attacked those
d.llvered prioe 878tems where they appeared to be
the core of price fixing conspiracies or destructive
ot competlt1on.Secon(\. it hal been too broadly
a:8.erted that all delivered price·. 'are unlawful ..
No Commlsa1onorder haa yet required f .o.b. mill

pricing, nor torb1d«1en treight absorption, except
in a context ot price fixing or destruction. of
competition. and since, of course. theComm18slon
has entered DB sucb order,. the courts have sustained none .. •

It •••ms 11ke17, that theop1nlona. of Juatl!ce Black and

Mr. Itason are rather extreme pointe ot view.

.1". FreerI'.

atat.ment 18 • much more rational and probable atat.m.nt of

the "resent legal atatua.

Certain.l1,the act10n of . the

1'.'1'.0. llae been more 1n,..ep!ngwlth thia atat:...nt.

Ai pr•• ent, the F.T.C. holds that It

1:8

n.~.18.rr

look hl.to the c1rcumetanQa, ..ot a .particular induetry

de.cU11ng whether there 18. ca.uai tor le..l action.

to

".to••

Legal

action will be brought Ol'll."itl

1. The delivered p;rlo1ilg .,..ate.is part ot a con ..
'P1J.a07 'toeliminat,eprloe competition.!

B.There 18 unlawful p:rlce d.1acr1m1natlon. 1.e ••

bu,.era are ohargeddUterent prlce. where the
d1fterence 1a not tull,. Justified -b7 dUterancea

incoat,.

such pr,ie. discrimination 18 unlawful

onl,. ! t i t injures compet1t,lon $JDong bu,.era.

01'

8ubatant1ally l ••••n. competition among the
t,1rmt. 1mmed1ata competltors. 2
CONGRESSIONAL ACTIO!
In an attempt to clarity the i ••u., Senator RemerE.

capebart (ft) of Indiana aubmltted a re8olution au"hartlins

the senate Committe. on Interstate and Foreign OODml8rce to
conduct an Snqu1r71nto the 1mpactotthe court a.cUlon.
on .business.

The Oommittee ftl tomakeltB stud., and pre-

sent recommendations to Oongress tor appropr1at,. aotion.

A.the re.ult of this Committee"

aet1vlt7 a bill . . 8 intro-

duced 1n Oonsre.1 1nthe summer of 19'9 whlch.ould bave
I.·

U

•

I

1.S& 0 if, lot the Sherman Act.
2. sec. a or the Clayton. Act .a amended.

I

J

•

declared a.mora.tor1uIn on F.T.o,aetlvlty 1n connection with
basing point pricing tor one year.

Thi's bill was: defeated,

however, Qnda bill introduced by Sena.tor O'Mahoney (D) of
\t7om1ng was proposed 1n ita stead.
The 0 'Mahoney bill declares the basing Points1stem to
be legal only when u.sed by a single aellerand. without other
price dlecrlminatton.

This means that under the F.T.C. and

Robinson-Patman Acts, del.1vered pricing a.nd freight absorption w11l llot be 111egal when used by a single I'rodueer.

The carrol and. Kefauver amendments to the 0 'Mahoney bill,
if adopted, would make it
in

If

il1~gal

to absorb freight costa

good faith" where the action would violate the Clayton

Act .a amended.

Theaeamendments have the etrect of killing

the "good faith" arguments r'o!' delivered prices.

This bill,

as amended.. passed both Houses of COngre.ss and was. aent to

the Conference· Committee.

In this Committee, the amendments

wereetr1pped from the bill tl.nd the wording of the bill cbanged
in su.ch a way that the u·goodf.a1th" argument could be used. 1n

support of

B.

delivered pricing system.

Also, the wording was

changeCl in eucha way tha.t the burden of proof that a price
fixing conspiracy existed would fall to th.e F.T.O.' The net

effect ot this, o.t course .. would have been to we.ken the
F.T.C'.,chancea tor successful pros-.,·cutlon ot 1nduatriea
u.ing the basing point 87,Btem.

The bill aareported from

the Conterence committee palsed the House, but a bltter

.argument develop'ed in

theS.na~e

and consideration ot the

bill was post,poned 'until the next session of con~ess.l
Thus, a,t the time of th1,s writing. there 18

110

new legiala-

t10n clarity,ing the legality of the baaing point system.

r

...

1. "TbeBasing Point Bill, tt!e~ RfltUbl1C,,. Oct. 31, 1949,
pp. 8 ..9. "Delivered Prlc,ii1g sf;I 1 l'UZ~7, "BUsiness Week,
Oct. 22, 1949, pp. 20-21. See these two ar:t&!cle8 lor a
moreeomplete d 1s cu8110n of the 0 'Mahoney bill, its amend,.
ments, and the changes made by the Conference COmmittee.

POSSIBLE IMPLICATIO,NS OF THE AJ30LITI0!1 OF THE BASING POD'if
SYSTEM OF PRICDl G ONTBEUTABSTEEL INDUSTRY AND ON
THE EGONOJvr! OF THIS REGION
THE GEDVA STEEL PLANT

All the steel produQed. :in the state of Utah at. the

pres.e,nt time is produced at the Geneva Plant.

This Pla.nt

not only produces for the immed1ately surrounding terr1tol'7,

but for eerta1nsegments ot the market throuFPout the west.
Its size and. the divers tty .of its market. outlets make it a
particularly good model fora. stud,. of the type proposed 1n

this paper.
Tbe Geneva Plant wa.built at the request oltha

orrice

or Production Mana.gement by the united states steel Corporation
witbout fee.

The original cost of construction totha govern-

ment was $191,000,000.

The steel products to be made by this

mill were plates and structural shapes for theneeda ot the
Pa cit lc Coas t sh.ipyards.

Since it takes approximately five tons orra.. mater1al
to produce one ton Q.fsteel. it 1s apparent that the steel
producing point must be located w1th an eye to proximity to
raw materials rather than to markets.

In selecting a site,

within the state of Utah, consideration had to be given to a

location possessing adequate transportation facilities ands1tuated at m1n.1mum d.1atanc88 from

BOUl"CeS

ot iron ore:lcoal, lime-

stone and dolom1te, it ...as necessary also to select a place
where sufficient freeh wa.ter

W8S

available.

These cons1deratlons,

along w1th tbl governsant'. w18b tod.centrallze the new .ar
"r

plant •. , 1'!.8ult\ed in the ae,l.etlon ot the Geneva Plant .it.
1
on t·h.shore of Utah Lake nea.r the city of Provo.

Tht Geneva .Plant 18 very favorablJ' located w1tb reterence to the transportation costs

Oll

raw materials.

Its coal

18 shipped a dletallc. of 120 miles, its iron ore comes from

Southern Utah open pit mlnea and moves

8..

total ot2S5 mil••

and its flux ( 1 imes tan. and dolomite) moves 35 mllea.

In the

words of walter JlathesiUs,pz,fJs!dentot the QenevaSteel

COmpany:
"Material assemb17 costs fo,r aeneva are favorable.
We can produce excellent steel for the Western
marketa. cheaply as anyone and more-cheaply
than most. Geneva 18 a fine steel plant. wl

As regards transportat1onfac111tles, Geneva 11el at
the junction of the railroad l1nes over which raw materials

are assembled, at the apex of the railroad linea that tan
out to the thre'eprine1pal Pacific coast markets and those

running to the North, .:at, and Southeast.

Also ita labor

supply can be drawn trom the largest eonnnunlt1ea in th.e rosion.
The plant has three blast furnaces with a dail,. capa.city

of 1100tona each, making a comb1ned annual total of 1,150,000

net tone of pig iron.

There arenlne open hearth furnaces

each with an annual capacity of 1,280,000 net tons

ingots.

or

steel

The plate mill baa a capacitY' of 700 .. 000 net tons

1. "The New Industrial west", (pamphlet published by the
United states steelCo.rpol'at1on, 1946), p. 143.
2. Arthur W.. Baum, "Utah'. Big BabY'," saturdaz Even1ns Post,
May- 15, 1948, P. 6S.

of t1n1shed p,lates per 78.,ll' .. and the atru'ctural mill, 200,,000

tone of varioue tJP•• and a ue. ot atru.otural .t.el.

In De-

cember of 1946, facilities ••re completed tor the production
of hot rolled coila.

This w111 not cnange'the a,bove mentioned

plant capacities excepttha,t much

or

the steel which formerly

lert Geneva as plant and etru.otures w11l now leave blrolled

coil form. 1

At the close of world War II, the emergency need tor
Geneva's vast plate and structural steel capaclty no longer

existed.

ThuD, the plantwa8 listed. tor sale under the pro-

v1s1ona of the surplus Property Act.

The united state. steel

COrporation almoat 1mmed1ately Bubmitted a bid.

Opposition

to the sale of Geneva to th18corporatlon developed in certain
governmen.tal quarters, on the grounds that it would make for
monopolistic control otsteel capacity in the western United

.states.

For this

~e.son

and others, the United state. Steel

Corporation withdrew 1ts otter.

Tb18 action by the corporation

resulted 1n an immediate movement 1n Utah to have the Geneva

Plant owned and operated by U.S. steel.

In

view of this strong

op1n10,n 1n the west and requests ot g()vernment otficials that

the corporation reconalderlta ,decision, United state. Steel
submitted a bid to PUl"cha •• the plant and inventories at
Geneva tor $47,500,000 and pledged that in the event

or

accept.

ance of its b1d, not les8 than $18.600,OOOad,dlt1onalot ita

1. Geneva steel Company Press Heleasedated December, 29, 1948.

own fund. would. be spent 1n the p •.ac·.tlmereconveralon o,t

the (]en'iva Plant·.

Tbi. bid ••• accepted,and peacetime opera-

tion. otaentva steel ••• ,subsidiary of 'the United states
steelCol"p'o'ratlon began on JU.ne 19. 1946. 1
'.mE COM,PARATIVE POSITION OF THE GENEVA PlANT.

It will be helpful. before any.ign1f1cant eo'n,cluslonB

are drawn concerning the.fleet of the new pricing pol1c7 on
the Geneva Plant, to take • brief look at the competItIve
position ot Geneva .1th' reference to the other Westernstea!

producers as well as the po.sible competitors from the East.
Betore any analysis can be mad. concerning the .treat of the
new prioing policy on the Geneva Plant, it is nec8ssar7 to

.aeerta.1n juat how the Geneva Pla.nt compares with other plants
throughout the United states and espee1all'11n the Western
United state., a8 regards pro.xSmlt7 to rawmater1als, types

of steel products needed and. produced, and production fa.o!lttl.s.
we.tern steel capacity 18 largely concentrated in the production or bare, 11ghtetructural ateel, rail and othertraclil-

age supplies, flat rolled or plate and tbinnel' than plate
guage steel, and wire and wir. products.
th~use

2

(See tig. 9)

ot

various produ eta ,Geneva prOdu eel light structural

to'rntl. plats_ and thinner than plate rolled steel.

Figure 9

reveal. that in 1944 the Qeneva Plantwaa the leading western
[

.;J

1,1

1. "The New Industrial west," pp. a..s.
a.Mahone,., J.R., "The western Steel Induatr7 with Special
Refer'ence to the poat"ax-Operation of the Geneva Steel
Plant," Utab Economic and Business Revlew, Vol. ;'-'.
Salt

Lax.

Cit,., 1944-45. Part I, pp. 37-9.
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producer ot light ,Itruc.tural and pla.te.teel.
addition otfac111ties.

'Ph.recent

tor J'o1.1ing plate steel to hot rolled

col1s of th.inner than plate guage. has changed this plct.ure
somewbat aothat no. the. Geneva Plant 1s producing. signl-

tlcl;nt-amount otrolled steel ooilaand smaller amounts ot
plate and struotural 8teel than f'ormerl,..l western capacit,.
in theprOduct1on of light structuralateel seems to be

more 1;han ad.•quat. to nl.$st the demand.

The demandfor·struc-

turalshap •• at Gen.8va bas dropped. otf to th..xtent that it
.asnecea.ary to 010'. the mill in June, 1949.

The etru.c-

tural mill was reapenedra%' limited produ.ct.1on in December

or the same :rear" but, the demand for Btructural shape. con.
tinu•• re1atlve17 weak, and the :future ot tbi8 mill at the
present time 18 uneertain. 2

The combined western capacity tor the production of
steel plate, and strip of thblner than plate guageB, prior
t,Q con.struet,ion of the aen.va and FontanA Plants was estimated

to be enough toeupp17 only- about 10 per cent of the normal

western demand. 3 Th1. should asaure the Geneva plant· a strong
and ratherateady market tor it. plate and hot rolled steel

products.

The moat recent f1gure. 1ndlcate that this ie, 1n

tact. the case.

The plate mill and, the bot rolled col1

1. Letter trom paul Sul11van j D1rector otPubl1c Relationa
tor the . .".". st.el company, to the writer under the
date of January 17, 1950. (HereafterreterX'ed to a.

Sulllvan Letter.)
2. lbidc
3. lalione), S'!.- .e.~

...

,'
Part I. 1'.3'1.

taol11tle.Ylere llaedat lOOpel'Ce¥ltcapaclt7 until. the
mtddleof 1.'9, and bay, been aperated attrom '10 to 80
per eentotcapaclt781nee that t1me .• 1
lh •• certa1n1ng tht comparative poaitlonottheaene'Va

Plantas regard. the coat. of' material.itt 1. nee.Baar,. to

mention the location of thavarlo\18 materials, the comparative
costa ot the mater1ala .mclud1ng transportation coats, and the

amounts of the material• •vailable for exploitation.

The Geneva Plantproduceasteel tz-om pig iron. us1ng onl,.
the m1n1mum amount ot scrap at •• l necessary to 1naure efficient

operations.
.q'\l81

Iron ore a.nd coking eoa1 are ot approx1tnatel,.

1mpo~tance

.a basic raw materials for the product.lon of

piS tron"S Evidence ot the favorable cond1frlons under which

iron ore hal been mined 1n Southern Utah, 1s provided

b,.

the

tact that production was approx1matel., 6 •. 4 ton. per man-hour
in the period Irom. 1937 to 1941.

These ealculat10na are baeed

on allot the emplOlllont requ1redtor m1nin.g the ore·, delivering it to the crusher and loading it on the railroad car8,

Production in the open pit mbesoll. the Me.8ab1 range 1n

Minnesota 1. approx1ma.telr 3 tone per man.-bour, intb.8 und.er"
ground mine. otAlabama it 18 about • '7 ton..

Add to this.

tbe tact that the ore. mined 1n tbe Me.abl range must move
by 1".11 a dietance ot 77 mile. to load.:tn.g docks, be unloaded

trom ,thers 1lroadcara and reloaded on ahips.

Then it moves

876 mlles over the Great Lakes, 1s loaded 8sa111 onto railroad
•

r·

d

1. Sullivan t.etter_
2. .hone,. ,02- e~t. , Papt I.

p~

'1.

4'

ca... , and then move. an ave1'flge dhtanHot 183 mil.. to the
plttabuJ'sb a:rea. 1 Gene..... ~on ore ItOve,1 15~ ra~l mil•• on17.S
!he .xtent ot theoredepo8,ltnow

Qen... Plant, 11 ,not def1nitely known.

will

be

e:xhau»hed at lome future date.

be~g

used b1 the

This d:epo81t,

ot cours.,

JU8't wher_the plant

will than turn to secure 1t801'e is not certain, line. complete kllowledge ot the extant, quality. location, and m1n1na
costs

or

all the possible sources of iron ore in th.1s are.

has not yet come to l'1ght.

In an,. event, it 18 probable that;

the great bulk of the 1ronan.d steel industry of the United

states will have to turn to higher coet iron ore considerably
lo,oner than the periOd when this w111 be required of the
Geneva plant.

:;

Probably the most important competitor

o,t

W•• ternsteel

produoera,partlcular171n the pacif1c CO.at markete, 1s the

Sparrow. point Plant of tbe Bethlehem Steelcompan1.
pariaon of the coat.

or

A com-

producing steel at this plant and at

the Geneva plant is extremely difficult since the coatI at

Sparrows Po1nt are not obtainabl..

This plan't 1mpol'ta 1.ta

!ron ore from the El Totom1n4l. 1n Chile.

The •• mine. are

located only fUteen miles 1nland from the port oteruz Grandt.

The ore 18 loaded bere on company owned.hip.tor the tl'lp,
4471 11:1181. to Baltimore.

The ships return empty.

In the past.

the- price otthe ChUean orehaa been ver'7 loY, but by the
oj

1. Ibid., p. 16.
2.
3. ISg ••.pa.rt I, p. 16.

ISm.

• • . fl 'l

"

rr:r.

time the ahippmICO.t."

1ruslQdlng the canal toll", bave

been.tlded., the, price of tb1a 'ore ba.• been about the aame
•• the, ore used by P1tt8burgbplanta. 1
The above ,tacts

88 • • ,tO

lnd1cat. tbat tbeeoat of pro-

duction of p1g u.on 1n Utah, 1s probably 108e than tor the'

plant8aroundQh1cage. pittsburgh, andothor centers depend.ent on take Superior or8e, allo, that in all probabilIty,
the cost at sparrolis Potnt.Kar1land, 18 somewhat 1n exc•••

of the

C08

tat; Qeneva.

It 18 more difficult to make a eomparlsonbetween the

coate of producmSpigiron at Geneva and at the w.est Ooast
productionpo1nta.Aa1de from the ateel plant at pueblo,
where the typical relationshlp betw.en piS iron a.nd 8crap
has prevailed. western steelmanutaeturins ha. been based
primarily on scrap.

That ,is, scrap steel 18 used in much

larger quantities 1n proportion top1g iron than i8 usual
in steel product1on. 2 Most of the piS iron used by plants

on the we8tCOaatcomes trom the, blast furnaces at Ironton,
Utab, and a.ome com.•• d.irectl,. from Geneva. 3 Th1e moans that

the pig iron used 1n the Pac1f1c· Coast plan.te must travel an
average distance ot from 700 to 800 miles b,. rail.

There are

blast turna.cea tor the production of piS iron at the Kaiser

steel Company'. Fontana Plant near Loa Angeles, but tho
capacity 1aonl1 432,000 net tons annually_

1. Ibid". p. 18.
X51~ •• p.

I.z. sullivan Letter.
1'-

In addition to
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this, all cok1nscoal for the operation of this blasttuJmace

comes from the utah coal tleUs, which means that it must
travel about 800 mUe.by ra1l .. 1
As regard. coal suitabia tor coking and blast furnace
use .. Geneva 18, aga.1n, tavol'*ably situated.

The total reserve.

of all the coa.lot the eleven western States amount. to approxi-

or

mately one. half' the total reserves of the united states.

this enormous reserve. 4Sper cent 18 located in tho cont1nuoue

andamoat unbroken Tr1-state t1eld, 1n Southwestern Wyoming,
There 18 very little

WGB,tel'nCOlorado, and Southeastern Utah.

coal woet of Western W70mmg and central utah. 2
Moat of the known western reserves of coking coal are
lo'eated in Utah. Colorado, and Ne.Mexico.

There may be

80• •

important deposits in Washington, Wy'oming, and Montana, but
to date, these fields have notbee.n explored. 3 This meane that
of All

t'h~

waa.te:m producers of steel,Geneva and Pueblo are

the only two plant.$ which are located within eas7 distance or
cok1ngcoal deposita. (Se. fiS. 10.)

AS for the relat1ve cost. ot scrap, thezae 18 no reason
to think that any large price d1tterentiale.x1Ita between

Geneva and the oth.r western producers.

Nearl,. all the scrap

used by the We a tern plants comes from the •• stern states.
Boat at the supply of steel a crap comes from the operation

1.

;.r.n.

~.

xom.

Mahoney, 02- c1t., P$.rt II, p. 9.

2. Ibid., Part I. p. ~

-----
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th••'eelturnaces an4:: polling lIill.~

likely that the Beneva p:1ant 18 large1,.
thls

80

1t 18 n~t un-·

B.lt~luppor1t1ng

in

mat.r1al~

Most otthe 1mportantt'ei"roalloya are round 1n',81zeable
blount. 1:1'1 the W••tern united stateh '!'he Clttnew
8S

p~nt1a

f'avorabl,. located with rs,terence to theBe as are1al'l,.other

prOducers in tbeUn1ted. states.,l
One important raw mater1a,l whiCh is otten

over~ooked

but which 1s extrem,ely vital to the operation of a steel
plant 1n Utah, is

water~

The l1m1ted supply 1n utah makes

Itnecessary tor those who are operating the steel plant to
become qu1te e.tt1cimt in, the proper and. full

utl11~a.t1on

ot

the water which may be avallable for uae. 2 Xl11tant conse~va..
tlon. bow.,rer, should make the supply adequate.

Not the leaat of the considera.tions on selectib g the site

for the Geneva Plant was the availability ot labo:r. I The
Geneva steel Company emploY!' 5500 men, one halt otthem at
:

the steel plant.

The problelll with reterence to labir was

not so much one of getting men as getting trained industrial
workers.

This problems.ems to bavabeen solved to the satisI

taction of all.

Moat o.f the employ.es were small t.rmers be.

tore they began wo.rk1ng1n tbeGeneva M1l1, but tbelracta indiOate that they have adjusted ve:ry rapidly and have become as
-

efricient

.I

JnOst steel l1ox-kerIJ 1nother j mOl'8 highly indus.
trialized, areas. 3 Tl'l.$ Geneva Plant compares tavora'tily with
a8

t

r

1. Ibid., pp. 19 ....27. . .. .
_..
....
I
2. WiI1f;.er Matbea1us, "Balf lfdlter1al Problems of the ll'lter--mounta1n and. West coast Areas," Pape!' pre$entad at the seventh
Regional TeebnlcalMeetlng otthe American Ironalna Steel
Institute. (san Francisco, 1948), P. 1,0.
3. Arthur W. Baum. ......loc,...........
cit •• P. 66 •

other plant8 in the tTnltt\dstat•• a$ regards the

q~11t1
I

and quantlt:rot 1t8 labor supply.

I

'The only othereonsidttrat1on neeel.8ary to pohlt out the
r~lat1ve

posit1on of the Qeneva Plant 1n thewesteT steel
an~

lllfllt'ket 113 the comparative El,dequacY' of its plant

The large amouJ'lt

equipment.

ot area ava1lable for the constru1t1on ot tb1a

In:tll has enabled the optimum location Of the variou,s devices

necessar,. to the pt-oduct1ve process.

Conveyor belt

_

move the

l

various raw materials to the aaaemb17 points.

All :the1ngre-

d ients ne cesBaryforthe production of p 19 1ronaremoved
d~ectly

from the stockpile,s to the blast furnaoes by a con..

veyor system.
I

The plant 1s arranged to allow for some divers;ity in the
final produots.
bloom1ng~lJ..l

'l'he Plantla equipped with a alabbi1ngand

wl1.ich maY' prod,uceo1ther blooms :for tbe struc-

tural mill or slabs for the plate mill.

Slabs may be either

used :bmllsdately or stored for conditioning and scarfing to
elhui..YJ.a.te defects.

The Ganeva platem111 is orricifallY

classified as a semicontlnuous 111111.T!lis mill is

with all the latest mach1nery and patterned after

~qUiPPad

tiEl most

lleeent cont1nuou.s plate mills that have been constrlUcted m

the tna:1n steel centers of the country. 1
In Deoember" 1948,inatallat1on

oi~

the, neoessary facil-

ities for the production of hot rolled c011 were

With tbe installat10n of the new equipment"
iff.

cO~i1pl&ted.

1n¢l.ud~g

It

slab

,

.que.mer, avel't1cal edger, two giant t1n1ah:1nS. stand. and
I

the'co11era, the finishing speed of the combined p~t. and

coil mill has been !nerea.sed to a maximum ot 2,200 teet per
i

minute, approx:1ma te 11 double the former speed .1 It 1s undou.bti

I

edl,. t·bi. addition to the capacity of the pla.te and col1 mills
that has allowed the plant to operate at from 70 t180 per

cent of capacitY' in spite of the shutdown of the structural
mill.

This plant and equipment compare very favorably with
the other western steel producing facilities.

Sinqe the

western 'producers are .• w1thtbe exception of the colorado
FUel and Iron Compan,.'s Plant at Pueblo, Colorado, Ibaaed on
i

the use otserap, theY' can 'never do more than supply a small

part of the total steel needs ot the west,

coata

~t

Geneva

!

are enough lower than those ot the F'acUie ,coast states producers that there should be no

~ea.t

difficulty forth. a.neva

Plant to compete in the sale ot steel on the west Coast.

This

contention 111 borne out by the fact that at prellentj' tbe Geneva
Plant 18 finding their principal marke,t outlet ,on the west

COast in spiteo! the transportation costs

1nvolve~.

EFl"ECT OF THE NEW PRICI~lG P'OLICY ON THE UTAH STEEL

IIIDUSTRY

The steel in,dustry. including the Geneva steelJcompany.
abandoned the basing pointayatem of computing
pr1ce. in JU17, 1948.

del~Vered

At this tim., the deman.d tori steel

1,. Press :aelease from the Department ofPub11c Relalt1ons.
Geneva steel companJ, dated Decembe.r 29, 1948.

wasmexee.$ of the Stl·Pp11,. and nearly everrm!11 lnthe
Un1tedStates was'produelng at

capaeltJ"~

I

SlnC8 the l-l'ket
I

ft,.·

not wba.t paatezpe1'1enoewould ind1catoas the 'Usual

th1ng1n the steel 1nduatl"1. an,. factual or statlsttcal stud,.
of the ebange.s oocasioned by the'

I

118W

tte

pricing systemi uniform
I

i

f.o.b. mill pr1cing,must he postponed until such

the market situation approximates what it hal been
vious years,

as

. pre-

Also, the Geneva Plant had beeri operaled as

a privata concern only since June. 1946.

enough time to 0;.110w

4

i

This is hardly

cOmparison of the conditions, before

and. aftel' the changed pricing polioy to be made.

It is for

these rea.son. that the study is made on the basis

01

economi0

analyais rather tl:l&n facts and figures,
UTILIZATION OF CAPACITY

I

The ,stael industry 1s crJ11raeterized by very niSb, fu.ed

costs relat 1vo to variable costs;.

Tl11s has lead to an esti-

mate that the average steel mill must produoe at from 30 to
SOper cant of capacity to eo:ver the overhead or fued

COS"tl. 1

This mean., in effect. that costs and profits in thJina.ust17
are very sensitive to changes in the rate of cal'aci.ty utili!

zatlon; average unit costs vary1ng inverse1:r. and profits

directly, with the volume of output.

The effe·ct of, uniform

f.o.b. mill pricing, as an alternative to basing pointpricinS'
on the utilization of: capacity is. therefore, or fundamental

1mportance in determining whetber tbe (}eneVaPlant
fA

stronger or weaker pO$1tion as a result of the

lill

be :1n

ch~.ru:;e.

I! .

1. 'W8,lter Adams, The strpcture of American Industrz, (New York,
195'0), P. 166.

57

The &me. capac1tU8. aft 80 al'r&nged that
in the proportion •.

ot tSnal product:.

.~

ohtm8tJ

produced 18 po,.lb1a.,
i

That 18, it '18 pOl81bleto converta,ome

,ot the ingots into

.'

I
I

either plate or thirmer t'ban plate polled stael,

01' !1nto

'

11gb'

!

structural form., depending on therelativeetrength of tbe
I

dema.ndtor these types ot products.

In

the past. tbe west
I

haa been .lurplulJ 8.1'-e. in the productionotetrue91l'81 shap •• ,

and a deficit at-e. 1nt'be production of !llates a.nd strIp.
I

current production figurea of' the Geneva Plant seem: to1ndl..
,

eate that this is still the

.

Of-Ule.

1

If

80,

.

I

the Geneva, Plant
!

is 1n a surplus

8.1'8&

w1thref.'erenee to one item

and in a def'1e1t9;rea with ret·erenee to another.

or

produ.ction,
The eftectl
I

on the capacities for the two types ot products mlg'ttt be
I

quite different.

I

ot

In the ease of 11e:ht atruetursl roms, the ex-1stence
!

a basing po1nt fJyst.·em mle!ht have made it p08sible t~ utIlize
I

enOUgh capacity to maintain prOduction of' this prod.t.et.

By

I

absorb1n.g t~81ght, the son.v.Plant could have made salea
i

outside theWeaternmarket.

Thus, in etfect. the a.tneva plant
I

I

cO'Jld have dumped
area.

80me

ot its

I

product in another nlant
•• h1arket
...
I

In all probability. this would have been don~ only it

it were 1mposslble to change the amounts of the types of final
product.

So longa.s the distant sale ,covered all var1a.ble
I

costs and an,. part of the fued eoste, the otf1·c1e.ls at the

GenevQ Plant would have been ju.stif1ed 1nmaking it from the
• u --a

1.. sul11vlin Letter.

atamlpoUlt ot profit,.

The effect (>n the steel .1ndustry ae

a whole would have 'been 80Jnewbat different. however.
the product would have been dumped in another

Sinee

compet~l'e

terr1-

tort. tho saving1n eost of 1dleeapac.lty Beerusing to the
aenevaPlant would I'lltve been of.foet by the loos to ~he cOlllpan7
in whose area the (1ump1nswa.s done. 1 At bast; the a.ggr.,gato
etfe·atonthe steel industry would have been ne1thercost
.SQving nor cost in.creas ing.
In the absence of the basing po1nt system, thej proponents

of de11vere.d p:ricing argue, theetfect 1n an area of

steel production will be cutthroat oompetition.

a~rplu8

Tiloy say,

that a1nes it will pal the producers 1n the 8urplu. area or

product to make any sales that will cover :all var1aple costs

and. some part !of the fixed. costs, every producer in this
s1tuat1onwill ultimately lOVier his price' to below the point

where total coats are co·verad.

The end result would .•. of

course, be thesurv1val of onlY,the strongeat. 2 It ~Ot"s not

seem likoly that this will be the outcome at the
Plarlt·.

aeheva

In tho first place, thitl plant can switch to the pro..

duct10n of the more readily saleable plates and atr·1p with-

out necessitatmg a drastic cutbaol;: :In total output.

If the

price were lowered under un1form t.o. b. m111 prloin'g to the

extent that salos could b. made 111 a more distant market

territory. that would mean that the prices to local buyera
I

.4.

t

.A

Y"_ . . . .

1. Frarik. A. Petter, "Exit BasinS Point Pricing," Tbe American
Economic Revl!-:, xxxvl11 (194B). p. B2S.
S. Atlama ~ ~•.. cf~... p,. 16'1.

I

••1'. l111e.l.el0••red.,1. Unl.e.8.1 th. gamsby 8.1lmg .1J'l the

mOl'.diatant marlee' 'terrl,o%'7 .ere more than enoughtio
otf'a.,tthe loa.e.engendered,1n .ell1ng at •• lower pl'ice
in the.ore 1mmed1ate' .,rket territor)", the .al•••ouldnct

be made.

A1IIO" the ownerlSof Geneva dono·t bave inve.tment

tied up in the structural mill to the ex.tent that would u8ually

be 'the....

It must bebo:rn. in mind that this mill".a pur.

chased at about one fourth the cost of conatruct10n.,The tact

that the structural mill was closed 1n m14-1949 ,without ..
p1"ice war being preolp1ta.ted seema to bear out this oontention •.S
Eight,. per cent ot the market for structural steel pre-

duoed at the Geneva Plant 18 on the Pacific Coast which leave.

on1'y 20 per cent 80ldin the inland western region. :s Thus,

it would a ••• that the po •• 1bl11ty or other' plants penet1"at1ns
Geneva"

prinoipal market,. the west Coast, under the basing

pointsyst.em, was fully as great as the possibility of Geneva.

su.ccessfully penetrating other market areas e,
this, it seems sate to

ecn~~~d~

In the light ot

that the net effect o·fthe

abandonmen.t of basing point pricing on the structural mill.
w1l1 be negligible..

There seems to be no logical justifica-

tion for the belief that it would have functioned any differently under basing point prlelng than at present.
The .situation with reference to plate and hot rolled.

strip seemssom.wbat different.

western demand tor these

1. Fa.ilure to do this would baa violation of Sec. 2 of the
, Clayton Act as amended., S8.supra, p. 22.
2.·,sulllvan Letter •.
3. Ibid.
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products haa been, ••'nd continue. to be, rather 8trong. 1
The major po,rt1onot the .teel which leave. the Geneva

plant 18 probably in the form of hot rolled, coila.

The •• '

are shipped to the (!oldreduotlon mill at the Un.ited stat ••

Steel Corporation's Pltrbabuttgh Plant located near San
Francisco, C81Uorn1a. 2 Thls movement of plate and bot rolle,d

c011s to the Pacific coast statea accounts for 92 per cent
01' the output

ot these produ,cts at the Geneva Plant.

Onl,.

8 percent of Geneva te output ot these items 18 conlumedln
the Mountain States. 3

What the effect of the abolition of the baaing point
system w111 be upon the ut111iation ot the plate and strip

capacitY' depend., upon whether the Geneva Steel CompanY' can
compete with the producer's of theee products on the west

coast 1n the matter of price.

Also. the produ:Jers of the ••

produ.cts on the Eastern seaboard must be considered as possible
competitors.

At the present time. the fisure. would1nd1cate

that Geneva 18 competing successfully w1thboth these groupa.
This

m8.7DOt

be a truep1oture, however, since the present

time is one of very larse demand..

Whether the Geneva Plant

will be able to compete in the future i f there 1s a large
reduction in demand. remains to be seen.
tha.t on the basis

or

The facta 1nd1,ea..te

costa of productlon,the plant at Geneva

should be in a strong competitive position.' The COlts ot

1. Ibid., Mahone,-, oR- cit., Part I, p. 48
2. Ginevasteel COmpanr-rr-e.IJ Releaee, under dat. ot December
29, 1948.
e~:,:111v&n Letter •.
4. See section on the comparative position of the Geneva Plant,
supra, pp. 40-51.

l-.
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tl'8napol'tation. however. are tul17 a;s1mportant as the comparative cost. of produetion..
the

t .o.b. mill

At

present theaeare suob that

price of plate mill products plus transporta-

tion costs to the west Coast result1n

Ii

price Which oempares

ta"orably with final pri,cea from other plants.1What the
freigbtratesYl111be in the future is, of course. 1mpo8s1ble

to •• y.

If there is no significa.nt change, however, it seems

. likel,. that the Geneva Plant w11l cont1nue to supply

8.

large

part ot the Pac1tic coast '8 needs 1n plate and strip ateel.

To determine what the .ftects or the new pricing polic,will be, it w111 be helpful tot1rst see what would bave

occurred under the baaing point system.

Since Geneva was a

basing point for its own products, 2 tbe'lJe 1a no reason wh7,
under tbe bas,ing point system, sales 1n th18areasbould not

have taken plaeefrom Eastern are.son

basis.

8

freight absorption

It 1s doubtful tbatth1s would have occurred .a ,.et,

since local demand is probably strong el1.ough to absorb Eastern

output of steel produets 1n most cases.

\¥hen demand tall.

below the level where steel producers can find local outlets

for near capacity product lon, the Pac1tlc COast, and even

the Mountain states, would be subject to market penetration
from Eastern produoers under the basing point .ystem.

pric••

from the Eaaternmilla would, of course, have been computed

on a Geneva-plue baai. whlch would hav.involved some freight

ot the Geneva P'lant
tOB.II most ot their present output on the Pacific Coast.

1. Thi8 tact 1s indlca.ted by the ability

'2. -The New Industrial west," p. 18.

, sa

ablorpt1on 1n nearl1 &.1108 ••• ,

Th1a would bav. been SUltt-

tled lx-oll th• • tandpo1nt· or profit, bowever, .0 long a. the
mill net return to tbe mill practicing the freight a.baorptlon
... enough to cover all variable coat. and any partot the
thed COlts.

Market penetration from t.be Ealt can occur under t.o.b.
mill pricing only 1t the mill price at the Eastern plant 18

auch that attertranaportation

hall

been added,the price on

the We.teoaat 1s as low as the prevailing price 1n tbls _r-

ket.

It may betbat the Sparro.... Point Plant of the Bethlehem

steel CompanyatBalt1more,M'4r)"lanc1. can share1n the "f)stern
market on this basls.

Eastern producers located inland trom

the Eastern Seaboard are almoat.urel,. el1m1nated as competitors
in th-e we.tern market under f' .o.b. mill pricing_

To lower

their mill pric.e toa level low enough toott •• t th.e dUterence in transportation coat. between the two are•• would be

disaat'roul a1ncethi8 would mean that this lower p;rlcepre.
vailed 1n their l0C8.1 market as 1'811. 1
The adoption ot £.O.b. mill pricing alsures the 1mma.

d1ate118urroundlng territor" aamarket for Geneva produoed

steel only.

the

e

Thus. the 20 per cent of structural steel and

per cent ot plate mill products which Geneva sella to

the local are.• are almost certainly going to be supplied by

the Geneva Steel COmpan,. in an,. event.

For even a

pl'odueel' to penetra te this market under

r

would be extremelJ' unlikel,..

.0.

~N.8t

b. mi1.l p2'1clng

To doth1. the west coast

1. Sec. Sot the Cla7ten Act a8 amended.

coast

produce%' would have to low... hi. mill prl,eto all burel's b,.

an .mount But'tlcientto ott••,t the transportation :from the
Cosstto the Intermountain area *
In the 11€llt

the 81*£8ctof the

or

theabOV.ana11s1., itseeme like17tbat

adopt1o~

ot uniform t.o.b. mill

p;r;l.c1ng on

the ut 11izat ion ot the Pl.tilt.... and· strip capac.1t1eawl11be

favorable ,oZ',at leal t ,:llot unfavorable.
POSs IBLE EFFE01' ON .LO:atrrIoN OF FUTURE CAPA CITY

The ettect of the abandomuent

or

basin!

po1ntp~1c1n8

on thepo881ble future locatlonal pattern of steel production·
,

in

utabu conditioned

this area.

by •• veral cona1d.e:rat1ol1speeul1ar to

The Geneva Plant, which was buil.t to satlsty .ar-

tfme demand tor certain products, hal suob large capacities
in comparison to what itsee.8 western demand will be_ that

1taeelt1a unl.11celY' tba t an,. new capacity ..,111 be added tor
80me time to come.

Itl and when. the demand in the Western

area increaaes to tbepoln.t where ne... capao.ltle.8 art justUied,

the new pric1ng

po11~7

11r11l und.oubtedly play an 1mportantrol.

in the locat1ona,l pa.ttern., however.

BecauS8 or the large amount of ...eight differential :In
the :raw mat'er1ala and the t1n1shedsteel., tbepl'imar:r 10ea-

tional tactor under an,. pr1c1nglystem 18 proximity to, and
ava.1lab,111t1 of, raw mater1ala..In8otar •• this 18 the governing consideration. utah. is favorable asa future site tor ateel

production.

An7 ducue.ion ot future location must have this

111 the background.

Aa to the effect ot the prlcingsyatem on

future location. hlatorrha. ahown that the allow.nce ot
new baaing points hal re8Ul'ed 1nthe 'movement &wa7 hom
the old produe1ngoenter. to new ones 8.nd the general dee'.
entra11zat1on of the 1nduatr7. 1 If' this 18 the result (fJ.t' merelr
.etabl18hing newbaa1ng PQ1nte, it seem,s l1ke17 that the re-

sult ot abol1ahing the 8yatem would have an even more pro..

found eftect in the a.me '. ,d!i'ect ion.
Because of the lack 01' an,. raw materials on thePl.cltlc
Coaat. it aeems likely tbat any future plante which are bullt
in that area. or an., ex.panl1on of exlstmg plants on the Co•• t,

w111 bav.to 'be on tbe basls of scrap iron and at.alae prin-

oipal ingredients of the steel production.

In the years

prior to World War II, tho supply ot .crap totbe coastal

producers was mo.re than a.mple to meet their needs.
shipment ot large amounts to

J'~pan

With the

and other Far Eastern

countries juatbetore the War, however, th1scc>ndit1ott changed,
and scrap was in shoX'·taupply.

Although these exports eeased

a sbort time prior to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, and although current scrap .uppl1.,. increased 8ubltant1all,.durins

the war Years ae a result ot west coaat ahipbuilding and other
war-time manufacturing activities, the ea8Y aupplf situation
of the pre-War Tears baa never returned, and 1008117 ava1lable
scrap luppll•• have since then. been hardly 8utt1c1en:b to meet

the needs or the gr'eatlr enla.rged capacity which now exist.
on the Weat Coast. 2 It' west coast production continues to

1. Fritz Machlup, The BasinS po. 1n
1949), p. 237.

2. Mathesius,

---

lOQ.,

t. szstem,

clt ••... PP. 14-15.

-.-.

(Philadelphia,
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grow at thl. great a:p ••d. even it the .teel plants on

ten.

coaat expand proportlona117. it '18 apparent that thepox-t1on

ot the ateel 1ndu:str7 in the west based on sorap call never
supply more than a pc?tion of the needed steel;.

This means

tbatsome add1tional eapae1t,w111have to be added 1n the

areas where iron ore andcok1ng coal are available.

Figure

10 indicates that Utah is more favorably situated. with re-

spect to these materialsthall are •.n,.

states.

o.r

the other western

Wbetherenougb. raw materials exist in utah

tOIUp ..

port anrgrea.t17 expandedateel output w1ll depend in pa.rt

on possible new discoveries and technological developments
which might made now known deposits usable.

AS regard. theefreet o·r t.o.b. mill prlcingon the

tu.tul'e loeational pattern, onl,.tbe broadest generalization.
are possible a.t this time.

Iteeemsratber certain that thla

type o.fprloing will have a decentralizing etrect on future
location of productive capaclt,...

1.8 given to locate

as

Under 'this 87stem impetus

near the consuming market as pOlsible.

It a small' plant can locate at the point of consumption it
has an-advantage 1n the local area over all other producers.
Th1sadva.ntage d1d not exist unde.l' tne basing point system.

where an70ne canidaell 1n that market on a freight abeorp ..
tlonbas1a.

Wbetberthe savings of large scale production

'are enough to offset this looat.1onaladva.nta.ge remains to
be seen.

Palstoost studies, 1r.t the steel 1nduatry indicate

ithatthi. 1. pro'babll not tb.s ca.e.

1

An addltlonaltuture .ttect of the change 1n pr1cSns

is that unde.the new syate. encouragement 18 given to independent producer. to begtn small .cale operat,1ona.

Under

tbe bas1ng·point system. tbe independent was at tho·merc,.
of the larger producer since the small produ'cer's market
was alw8.1S open to invasion.

This 18 pa.rtlcular17 s1gnU ...

1cant in the Western areawl1ere the united states steel
'Corporation at present contro'ls 51 per cent of the output
'of steel ingo'ta. 2 Whether or not the advantage given to
the lmall ind.• pendent producer is great enough to overcome

the tremendous advantage ofs1ze of the gia'nt concerns re ..

rna ins to be seen.
POSSIBIL!TY OF FORCED RELOCA'l'IO!J OF EXISTING CAPACITY

Probably the greatest amountot controversy wh1chhas
come out of the decisions forcing abandonment of the basing

point slstem in the steel and cemEfnt1ndustr1es.. eenterain
tho idea that the adoption of t.o.b. mill px-icing will force
It.

vast amount ·of relocat1onof ex1sting production fac111tl•• It

It is argued tha.t these industries have grown up under the

basing point system and located in· such
most from this pricing method..

Now

Q

wayaa to profit

that the system bas

been abandoned,. these plants are no longer atoptimuln locations and. will be forced, in many oases,. toelo!uJ down or

..

wr I

c

1. Th$Ba81ng point Problem, T.N.E.C. Monograph 42. (Wa.shington •.

19:tl),p. -al •.

2.

II

Ad.mB.o2.~1t.,

J

I

'

....

u

p. 160.

.

.

,
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move

'0 • more tavorablt loeatton.'
Itap,evs that tbeJ'e m:1ght be.o•• justificatlon tor

the •• bell.t..

The baaing point syate• •nQou~ag.d the •• lec-

tion ot loca,tlon'l on the ba.au of a8semb11coata rather than
on the baa1so,t pro;x,imit1'to market Qutleta. 1 This can be
eas111' seen in the ca •• otthe P1tta,burgband netroltar••••
Detroit haa onlJ t)per cent of the steel capacity 1n the
United states and con.um•• If5 per cent of all the .'8.11>1'0-

duced 1n thiscountr7t

On tbe other hand, Pittsburgh and

the immediately surroundlng area produees 40 per cent of'

t,he nation'. steel while this same area consumee only-20
per cent ot thenat10nal output.

Tb,18 meane that one balf

of all the steel produced in the Pitt.burp area mu.t be

exported to other consuming region'..
between the.e two area a is not

la~ge

The cost dlfferential
enough to justify this

very- great discr.pan'c1 1n eapecltlea. 2
It can also be shown h1atorieall,., that the baaing pamt

Il"stembaa tended to encourage the expans10n of ex1at1ng capac.·
1ty and retard,

.hitt.in productive facilities.

In both the

steel and oement 1nduatr1e •• tb.re bas b'een a notable reluc-tance to grant baaing po1ntatatu8 to ne.mills.

This dela7-

e41natallat1on of new producing po.ints &1 'basing pOinte,
with baae price differential. smaller than .freight differentiale
- I

1.

){aChlUP.O~.Oit.,

p. 160, Daugherty. deChaBeau, and. stratton.
The ,eonOll\ Q$""'01"tbe Iron and steel Induatrz, (New York,
I§Sr, pp. S42-i.

2. Adams ..

21- cit., P. 175.

from old areas, haakept the;

d.ll~'i'.4 p~10.

at too high

• 18.,,81 to permIt sufflo1tntd._mand to, d.e"elop ':In the ne"
area.

'this has retarded the growth of l'ag1ona,1 produ ot ion

oapac1t1.

1

The .1nten •. lt7 of reeling a.bout the

p~181b11:1t'1

of forced-.

reallocation 18 exemplified b1 tbe fOllowing 8tat,ement made
by the General

Prea1dent 't>tthe Un1ted cement, L1lnGa:nd GypalUll

Workers International Union betore the Senate Bubcormnltt ••

on Trade practicest
"The moving or cloaing of any of thea. large cemerrt
!)lants, or eve,n l'Qrt of Q, plant, would disrupt the
oommunity life of these small towne, becauaetheee
small towns are more often one-industry communities.
At\t that. it would be impossible for most of the ••
workers to migrate to new 10 ea t10n.S because of
family con.d1ttons and otber reas()ns j and it would
all result in the creating of small ghost-towns,
such as we have experienced in cOB.l-minmg 'commu~
nlt1es after the supply has been e.xbaueted ••• "2
c

That the adoy t1on

or

r .o.b. mill pricing will aceelel"S.te

tbe tendency- to regionalizo pr1:ma.rY'l'roduet1on fac111.t1••

can be pla1nl,. aeon.

11onetheless, to expect the adjustment

to occur overnight 1s to repla.ee reason with hysteria.

rartl.

eularly 1s tbis the ease w1'th reterenee to the westem area •

.No reallocation of fae111t1esha. bee.n r,oreed

1,."'l

any area of

the u-n1ted states to date beceule or the large demands tor
both .teel and cement since the bal.ing point system was aban-

doned.

!t i.e extremel,. fortuna.te tMt tb.ls ohange over was
d

-'1

...
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mad.e in a period of above','ave:rase demand.

adjustment. whiCh must be ttad,e

,caD

The locatlon.al

now be made

mOlle

gadual17

and with les8 111 effect than would have been the case in a.
period of lower dflmand.

If tt,e preae.nt h1ghrate of steel

consumption continuos, it ,is very possible that adequate

return onlnvest,ment. made in areas whioh will be surplus
Under f.o.b. mill pricing, can be aeoured. 1
The Geneva Plant seems to be in a completely secure

position as regards posBible reallocation of fac111tle·a.
It is supplying a deficit eteel' producing area which. because

ot the nature of raw material location, will

in all proba.bl11tl

continue to be a deficit steel producing area in the future.

!n add It 1on,. the 'oeneva. Plant was not built w1th an eye to
the delivered. pr1c1.ngeYBtem, altl1ough.1n all fairness it
should be said that1t. location proba..blywould. llave been

the aame 1£ it had been.

The Geneva plant was, instead,

built to m1n:1miJe assembly coata of raw materials, near
adequate raw

ma~erj,a18uppl1&o.,

fa.?U

~t &.

PGlint where it"ould

be relat1ve17 secure from possible enemy •. ttack in wa.rtime.
It

8 .• e1111

unlikely- that reallocation of the Genevatacl1-

lt1es would take place in the near future even it it were
econom1cally-juatlt1ed, which it certainll" .1s not.

Firat

beoau •• the investment of the present owners 18 only a fraction of the construction eost.

$800n4, because it would
,- - *

1. Adams,

O~.2':.t.,

p. 184.

.- ,

'0

be ••ir... l,. costly to

mo~.'

the •• tacl11t1e •• Th••• eon.l-

deratione are of acad..mle tnt.rest on17 a1n.oe the Geneva
plant.lll b. favorably located under the n... pr1eing ay.at ••.•

since f.o •. b. mlll pri'c1ng .111 provide

1nc~:ltl••

tor

et •• l eon3,umera to locate in areal of surplus Iteel produc....

tlon, and tor new at •• l produt';ing plants to locate 1n d..fIctt
producing areas, the state

o~

utah and the Geneva Plant will

both benefit undOl'tbe cbanged ."stem.

Th1a 18 becau.:ethe

stat•. itself is asurplu. area illlteel prOduction, whil.
the area served b7 the Geneva Plant 1s a deficit steel pro.
dueingarea.,

It would be a mistake, however, to expect
\

an,.

_.8

migration ot fabrication plants to tb1s are.

o~

result

th. Changed pricing 'policy-

1.8

a

'The preponderance of

demand tor 'a.bricated produot. 1n the W•• t 18 111 tbe ,ac11:'lc

eo•• t

State..

Because of the co,ncentrat1on of demand there,

and the.mall &mountot demand, b7 comparison, in the inland
W•• tern regton, it .• eems likely that In the tuture.
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in the

PIlat, ta.brlcatore 91111 continue to locate as near tbeir market
outlets

.,S

possible, 1 ••• , on the , ••UloSo.at.

!h. moat

obvlous rea.on,of course, 18 because 1n a vast majority ot
ca ••• ,th. freight rates on the finished produet are 81gn.1tieant17 higher than the rat,elon the steel used asr... material.

(For example. l'at •• on she.t steel are much lower than rates
on finished refrigerator•• "

It mlg)1tbe tn.t !nsome particular

case., the .elght loat in the fabricating proce.1 is enough
to overcome th1a d.1tteren.ee 1n l'Ittea bet.een steel

.e

a raw

material and tbe f1nished tabr1ca.ted produGt. and i t th1a

w.",tru., the .stat.:llC.

or

compa1"8.tl.ve.ly low, pr1e•• at the

Geneva Mll1 would be anhloentlve .tolo'oa,tlng 111 th1a are••
Itmu81 be re:cogn1zed t how.vlr, tbat th18 wou1dbe an unuaual
situatIon" and ,that the freight d1fterent.!a.l would. be one of
blgher treight ontin1shed products in nearl,. all ....s.

On.

try

oth.~

1n the

pO.8:1ble consideration is., rabl'icat1nS indus-

w•• t wbieb .erved a market whlch was notconcen-

trated on the PacUl.e GO•• t.

If such an induatrr ext.ted,

it would be to the advantaSft of the owners to loeat. whel-e
the coata of procuring tbe raw matertal were least.

In the

We.tern United statea,thl• •ould mean locat1ng near the

oen...

Pla.nt,

By doing tbls, the producel"s 1n this indus-

try could .erve a wider market. geographically. than could
produce~.

located at an,. other point.

Sere again, however,

the situationwQuld be exceptional. and tor the overwhelming.
tnajor1trot tabr1-oating industr1ea in the western tln.1ted

states, the market lsconcentrated in the paoific coast

statal.
There is one o'tberpo8.1ble outcome 'ot the·changeto

t.o.b. mill pricing w1th lte:rerence to location ot steel produ.c1ng facilities.

Thla possible locational effect ariae.

from the tact that there •. re many t)'p". otlteel produot_,

partleularl,. certain 8'teel &11078, whioh are n,ot produced 1n
the w88t. 1 Under theba.a1ng po1nt eyatem,t,b••• items .ere

1. Economic In.t ltute. DellveredPrlc1ns and therutureof
American .Bulin.,a •• u.s. ali.ber of Commerce,. (Wa.!ili'i8~on,
1948) p. IGI.n. Hr. F.B. Delong, Vice president 1n Chars.
of sai8a. COlumba steel company, stated at theme.ting ot
the Industrial plantl'J)cation Committee of the california

state Chamber of Oommeree, that 35% of the steel eonaume4
in the west comes from the Eaat.

unquestionably, 80me of

the steel consumed was or type. not produced in 'the West.
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luppl1edto western con.um.... on an Eastern-baa1ng...po 1ntplu.-t~.lgb.tba.·u.

tJndel'unitol'Dl t.o.b. mill. pX*,lemg,the,.

m,.t8t be:sup,pl.1ed on an t·.o.b.-produ.o1ng.po1rlt-plu .B-.frelgbt

basil.

Any fre1ght abaorption which may hav.occurred on

the sh1pment of the •• 1tems under the basing po1nta,..tem 18
not pOI •. 1bl;e under unitorm t.o.b. ml11 prioing.
1·.0080£

:tnth• •b-

the baaing point 8,.8tem., there 1s additional 1nean..

tlve for newcompanl.". to construct new facilitie8, or to
add to exl,ting plants the :tacl11t1esfor tb.• production

ot .tesl products not tormer17 produced

in this area.

It

• ne. compan7.or an.exl.t1ngoompan7. decided to construct
.fa c111t 18S torprodu et ion ot some of these items, th.,. could

be relatively certain tbat the prioe tor tb.e same product
from Eastern productioncentera would be comparativel,. high.

This would be because of the transportation coats f':rom the
East or K14-"'G.t to the Far west.

ThuI, it the new company.

or old company with new facillties. ha,d high production

coata

ro~

the tirst

.8'••ral

lears, the,. could atill

com.

be

parat1ve17 certain that their market would not be invaded by

East'ern producers because of the fre1,gbt dUterence.

Such

invasion was, of cour•• , poa.1bl.e under the basing point

8.,atemon a fre1ght .. b.o~ptlon basts.

It ahould be borne

in mind, however,. "that in no ca.8e OIlll the price charged by

the western producer be higher than the Eaaternprlee plu8
tre1ghttrom the East since the Eastern produoers could
vad.• the market it this were the case.

It 1" a"pparent

m-

",v

tbatthe PJ'ice to ••• ternconaumera of atee'1 produeedin the

Eaat, or Mid....at exclusively at present,mlgb:t b.hlgher by
the· tUIGUint o·f freight absorption carried ,o'n while the basing

po1nt.wa.s in us., but the .potent1al long-range effect 18 the
•• tab11ehment of facilities 1n the W.at to.X' the produotion of
the.e item., and ult1matt)l,. lower prices..

Theravorab·le com.·

b1natlon of r.source. 1n Utah make 1t a l1kely spot toptutura
construction

or

theae addedfac111t1e8.

.,.
The argument moat f2l'equ.ent1,' used by advocate.

ot

t,be

baahis po1nt a·7ste. 1& that ita abolition w111 make posaible

a situation wbe:r• •very1aolated producer can oharge ratat1v,l,.hlgber prioel to those consumers, located near b18
plant.

Th1su po.s1bl.• , l t 1& a.rgued, because each mill

w111 be protected by a ... 11 ot freight rate. from competition b,. more distant •• 118rl. 1 This, of course, would. be a

vep., unde.Utable development since 1t woul.d constitute
reduction in competition among producer..
argument

Nfl••

8

Therefore, the

the el1mination of baaing point prlc1ng doe.

not make tor competition in the steel industry, bu.t will
have quite

tn.

opposite erfect.

It create. a aerie. ot

local monopolies.

Tbuargament overlooks many 8ign1tlcant considerations.
In the first· place, the ateel industry has in paet ,..ars been

cbaracterlledbylong perlods of excea8 capacit.,.

tfhua, during

the 1920 1 8, the utilizat10n ot capacity averaged only 71.6

per cent.

Durin, the decadeo·f the 19ZQ t s. tbl. tigure tell

to 48.3 per cent, and..a late as 1946. onlY' 72.5 per oent
"a.8 being utilized althoughtb1a figure ha, risen to near
100 per qent since tbatt1me. 2 i'hu$, in the past, therehaa
•

1. In an interview with: .A. Wood,V1ce.Prea1dent in Charge
oraalee of the Utah Idaho Sugar Company, th1a argument

was the one principle used to support theexlatence of
basma; point pricing in the 8ugarinduatry" ct. also,

T.l'I.E.C. Monograpb 42, p .•. 82.
B. Adams ,2£. c~~:r., PI'. 176-' a.

73

usual17 be •.n a slgn1tloanta.IlOUIl't of pre.aure on the avenge
steel produceX' to.spane!

bu •• l..

his capaelt7more etfectlve17.

1n aneftort to utl1be

It t'h1e condition ot exc•••

capacit" returna 1n the future. and. it oerta.1nly bas an
excellent chanee ot doing. eo"the individual produ.cer w111
ap1n be anslou8 to expand aalea, and utilue hi. capac!t,.

to tbe gr.ateat extent pos8ible under the cOnditions of
tho future market.

Even it he:

~.

acomparatlvaly18olated

producer, he wl11attempt to expand his aale. area it be
18 f'aoedw1th.8xeea8 capactt,._

The on1,.

can be expanded under an t.o.b. mill

w.,. the sa18. area

p~1c1ng

system. 18 tor

the producer· to lower hil pr1ce.8 by an amount sufficient

to attract

~7.r.

market terrltory.

from the peripher'1

ot a. rival sellers

It this 1. done, the local consumers

11'111 sbare 1n the pr1ceredu·ct1on extended to the dietant
oonsumers and the effeot w111 be that

altho~gb

pli'ociucer in fact does bay. a monopo17 in

tn.

tbe isolated

immediately

adjacent market are•• the prio. to these consumers m.lght verJ'
well be lower than those whicb would obtain under the baa1ng
po int 8:rst,•••

If, on the other

band, the

180 la ted

mill 1.

100& ted in

an area. which 18 deficient ineteel prod.uotion .facilitie.
80

that the1mmed.1atel,. surround1ng area more than consumes

the output ot this isolated. mill. there .111 be no pressure
on this seller to lower his priceeand expand hia marketa,

Under these conditione, the local consumer m1g)1t honestly

'16

be at the mere,. ot the onl3" producer in the ar.a.

Even it

thi. situation occurs, t t l•• t111po881ble that st ••l p%"lc,.
w111 be a8 low or lower than under the basing point If.t ••

because of decre.a.dcosta 1n transportat1on due to the elimination of cross-hauling and the d1aappearance of non-ba ••
mills. 1 It 18 oonce:Lvablethat being at the merey or one
mill mlg)lt be preferable to being at the mercy O.t

fA

whol.

industry united 1n oine prlce. S lt the leola ted mill did,

however, fix its price. to the local consumers at a very
high level, this should be only a temporary condition.

If

this isolated mill cont1nuedto make unusual protltsover'

any cO.na1d.erable period •. other producers would oer'tainl,.
be attracted to this area. and in time, thepr1ce would tall
to a more reasonable level.

It should be recognized. that

the large inveatment neeelaar,. for steel production might

delay thi8 adjustment tor 8ometime, however.
Tbe Geneva plant quite definitely .falls into the first

of thea. two p.o8albl.' a.l'ua.tlon..

The Geneva Plant is com.,

paratlvel,. 1aolated geographically, and doe. not bave anyth1ng

approaching $utr1c1ent demand In the local market to allow
neareapacity operation,._

It would be ridiculous, theretore,

to argue that the new pricing system bas put the local con..

8umers at the mercy ot the Geneva Plant in the matter of
prices.

If the management of tbe Geneva Plant attempted to
P , JI

1. Bond, ~.clt., p. 58.
2. "U.S.. ·a8nIt Pt-lcea.,"·Fortun.. , xlII (1936), p. 136.
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ra18. their price. to tbe local bttJfJ"I.and con••qu.nt17 to
the Pacific CO•• , bU,-era, the plant would. 10•• a great de.l

alit. Pac1tlc

eoa.t market

eltbfn;- to pro·d.u08:ElB on the

pac1ticcoas't or to EIl.tern seaboard··producer..

Selling to

bUyers on the Pac1t1cOOaat at a price below tbe p7ice to
local bUrel's plus freight totheOOast is forbidden. by

S80-

tion! ot the Clayton Act a,s amended b7the RObinson-Patman

Act, as being price d1sor1m1na.t1on injurious to competition.

Therefore, the local consumers must participate in an,. price
conce8810·na to Pacific coaat consumers,

Of course, there 1s

alwaye the poss1bility that the producers who supply the
we.tern market

ml~t

fix price. !nooneert, but.ven if this

oeoupred, there 1s no reason to bellev. that the re.ultant
pplce would beat a highs'%' level than the basing point

price.

Also. tbls could scarcely be consideped as being the

result ot the abolltlon otthe ba,.1ng po1ntIY8tem.

COn-

trary to the etfect of creating a 10ea1 monopoly in eve17
isolated steel producing a..rea, the a,d,option of t.o.b.ml11
pr1eing w111 have the effect 1n most a:a.-ea. ot guaranteeing

the local buyers against monopoly pricing.

Certainly. it

appears tba t this will be the· outcome in l1tah.

'lHE BrFlCT ON PRICES

!here aI". aeveral "flalone toeuspeat that the abolition
of ,tbe balmg point system wIll not brine with it prlcecom.
,

,

pet1t1on1n. the st •• l indultr,., either in the we.t or elee-

wbere.

The first of tbeeereaeona iatbat the demand for .,.el

1s probably relatively

1nela~t1e ..

"bleh means that n·o s.1gnit.

lcant expansion of marketa'1s possIble as tbe Xiesult 0.£ indus-

try.w:l.de price cuts.

Thb 1nele.st1clty of demand 'to"!! etee'l

products probably results :in part from the tact that these

products are usuall,. used for further production.
,

That 1a,

most steel demand lsd.rived. or secondary demand.

At lea.st

tbis seems to be the case with tbe products produoed at the

Geneva plant.

steel 18a180 ebaraeter1zed by a lack of sub-

stitutes and there are not man)" things tor which steel can be

substituted.

This means that price cuts in steel w111 result

1no'nl:r a minor increase 1nthe amoun.t demanded tor su.bstl-

tu tion 1n

man)"

ca.88a.

The amount or steel contained as ra.w materla.l in a
t1n1shed product is, of course,ot pr1marysie1l1ticance 1n

determining the elasticity or demand Qf a particular buyer
who uses 1t1n f'urthel!' production.

General17 speaking, the

proportion of tbetotal eO$t to the coat or the eteel:ln the
finished product will vary inversely-with the bU7ers elastic-

ity ot demand.

Thus, if 'the cost of eteel 18 a minor part of

the total coate, tbedemand 18 11kel'yto be les8 elastic
than would be the case it steel

COlts

were a large part ot

the total

COltl.

It an average price per pound of 3.50 ctnt.

tor all steel p:ttoducta 1, .a,umed. the tollow1ng 1e. 118t of

the total east otateel used in some :rather common artiel•••
Th• •pprox1:mate cost of the steel in an electric refrigerator

1s $6.(2) in. typical passenger automobIle, $124.041 1tl a
typical farm tractor, $64.001 in a modern a1xroom bouse,
1
$296,S7, and in a railroad freight car, $1610.00. It can

besesn from thieverY' incomplete l1at, that tbe elast.lc1ty

or

demand tor varioue producers

or

goods in 'Which steel. 1.

uled a8 a raw material might be subject to rather widevariation a8 the result of the relative 1tnportance of the coat of

steel to, tbe total costa.
For the purpoaes of this ana17811, however,. it may beot

more s,1.gnltlcan.ce to ascerta.1n tbe effects of a change in the
price of steel on the coats of pl'oduc.1ng commod1ties which
us. ita. a raw material.

It 1s 1n this connection that the

relative unimportaneeot eteelprieecbanges to many conattmers

can be most clearly seen.

For example:

" ••• under 1948eondltions, a $5 per ton ohange in the
price 0.£ all steel products going into a $1,500 automobil. 'Wouldatfect .thecoBt of producing the automo..
bile about $8; a $20 electrio toaster would be affected
by lesl than one cent; a $28S electric refrigerator b7

1.''1'0 arrive at the approxhate pr1ce of .teel per pound, price.•
of selected steelprod.ucts per ton were taken from: "Basic
Data Relating to Steel Prioes," 81 Dong. end Se88.PUbllahed
by the Joint Committee, (Washin.gton, 1950). pp. 11.,16-31.
These figures .ere divided througb 'by the number or commodit lea and this figure was then divided by one ton to set
the approximate price per ton. This price was then multiplied by" the number of pounds of steel used in the various
product. to d,etermine the approximate cost or the steel
used in each. lfo attempt has been made to include freight

costs or extra.. In lome cases these might make a considerable difference in the final cost or the steel used.

D\I

GleentsJ a 0184 galll'anp' b,.49' .centil, and _$130
alhingmachine b7 ~5cent8wh11e tbe cost ofb1l1ldinS .. ,35ator1 .teel"tra.e office building would be
att"otad bV s1x.,ten.ths ·of one per cent.,tll
For some other th,1nga in.bleh more steel is used the .a.tfeot

of aprioe chan.gewould be greater but in almost every case,

the .,tto'ct ot a price change in steel on the tota'lcoat of
the commodity is comparat'lvely small when compared w1thtb.e

tins'l .alepr1ce.
In addition to the inelasticity

o·t demand. torst'el,

the industry is Characteri!8d by a b1gbdegree otconeentra-

tlon.

A stud,. of annual eteelcapae1t1ea as of January 1,

1949. showed that the twelve largest steel e011lPan16! con'trolled
93.69 per centot the DUtputot stoel ingot., 88 •. 18 per cent

ot pig iron capacitY', and 82.66 per cent of the fac111tlee
tor finished bot-rolled steel. 2 The sltu·f1't1on in the Western

steel markets.. one of even more concentration with one
oompan,-, the United states Ste,.l CQrpora.tion" controll1ns
39 per cent of all steel capacitY' an.d 51 per cent ot the

capacitY" tor .• teel 1ngot•• ~ Add to the capacity in the Welt

owned by the United state. st.tl Corporation that owned b7
the Bethlehem steel Corporation and the KaUer Steel Compan7.
andpractlcal17all steel capacitY' !nth. Welt 1. accounted

for.,

There are some email independent producers 1n the west

bUt they are dwarfed by eompar1llonw1th the three big eompan1••• 4

1. Adams. 22.~ e1t." I P. 1'70.
' . .
2. American Iron and steel Institute. Dlrectorlot Iron and
steelworks, of the Unit-eel state.a.nd dinada. (!9:tB)
S. Adams. OPi.eC1t;~ P.
4. Sullivan ',' MrJ MahoneY' • .22,_clt., Part I, p. 71. The

mo. ·

Colorado Fuel and Iron Compan7-nant at Pueblo .18 omitted
beC8u.IG ltdoe. not aerve the same general market a8the

above mentioned companies.

The wI.tern.teal induatrl1a an excellent e:xample ot a.n
011gopo111tio industr,..

There are a few .,.1181" ota homo-

geneous product, and ever7seller must cons1dertbe action ot
all others.1181's when be changes ht, price.

(see fig. 11).

This makes steel prices "at icky·· and given to les8 frequ.ent

changea than would be the .... it the steel market were competlt~ve,

It can be ahoYllit.hat in t he past, steel prices have

fluctuated relatively 1e,. than Iteel output and employment.

(s.e tig. 12). A1Go, thatateel prices ha.va tended to fluctuate relatively 1••• than prices of commidltl•• produced 1n
...

1ndust1"1•• characterized by a smaller degree ot centralization of control,

(8ee tig. 13).

These characteristics

ot

the ateel tnduatry 1tlt\8t be considered wben ananalys1a ot

the etrect ot a new pricing pollc7ia attempted.
When the baaing point system was abandoned in July,

1947 I the immediate .trect wa.• an increase in price.

Most

wrlterson the subject a grEta that man,. mills had set their

base prices under the baaing point system at a level high
enough to allow tor 80me treight absorpt1on. 1 It this were
the case, then tbe log1cal outcome

or

abandoning the delivered.

pricing system should bavs been to lower the t

.0.

b. mill

price. 'b7 the amount of the coat deerea •• occa81oned b.,.. the
I

0ia

,

1. ef. Ma chlup #
cit., p. 7S,Oorw1n D. Edwards, "The Effect
ot the Recent . 81iig Point Deo181ons on Bu.in••• Practice.,·
American Economic Revie. , xxxviii (1948);- p.. 839; Norman
1'07,
Ea.ental. ol'the steel Produ cera t Right to
compete," Delivered pr101n~apd the Future ot American
Busm••• , 6.8. Chimber or '.' mmerce, (wasii1i1gton j 1919),
p. 118.
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.OLIGOPOLY. Partial control

cP
OftI'

a ooaaodity price

~

• tn

••11eN aoUDI to 10_ extent as a group. Bach ..11erua hi..
• eU wba" Win be the .tt.at or hie action on the bahaY10r o.t the
other ••118"'_ It th. pNCluot- lahOJlOpnoWt, a prlceout .~ OM
••11e.. "1' ntault. in price oute 'by the o\hers. • •• Under olif.fOPDlY'.
ou\put doell', not respond t_dla....ly to attltta in t.he marginal. oo.t
cur.... .. 1n Lh. ca.. of .,nopo11st1c oompet4 tloD where each tim
dieNI_de the aotion of other tirms ••• " Byrne J. Horton. Julien
Ripl.;y, and }i.a. Sobnapper. Dictionary of Modem Eoonomic8, (Wuhineton, 191,8) p. 2hS.
The line n,l.ll', "prenn'" the cha~ter1.U,c demand curve tor
a tina operating In an oligopo11atic ark.t. '!be • . - n t D,X, 1.
relat1wly elaatio, the "paint. lin'. 1. relatively 'in.lattc. The
price uader the aboV8111uwated condItions would be at point P, and
tile MOunt deunded, at point Q.. Tho kink in the demand eu.rve ari __
troll the tact that 11 the produc:er :raises hi. price, it 18 likely that
tbe otherpJ'Oducerawill not follow the price lnereaae. Thue, it he
rat••• hi. price, he doea so on the .1..\10 8~Amt of hie demand
OUMf8.. Ttli. _ana that his total reoelpta aove in the oppo8ite direct1ontrom 'tJle prl.o.. ()1 the other hand, it he lowe" hi,. price, he
expects the othe~ p'rodueera who .hare bie market to lowe1* their price.
by an .wn gr••ter amount so that h18 reduction tn pri.ce w111raault
in a le.8 than proportional. loora_ in the number of unite he can
.aU. This 1. tatamount to aa;yinl that. It he lower. hie price, he
do•• 80 on the 1.nelaat1c ••pent of bi. demando\U"'N. It this 18 the
0_, hie total reee1,pt8 will now move in the . . . direotion as hi.
prIce, or down. Tltu.•• 1.t 11 eaaUy .een, t.bat given the above conditione, the individual producer can MXi!91•• hi. ~t.al receipt. only
at the point wbe" the other tt",. in hie market area he". aet the
price, at the point wheN the deund ourw 1.8 kinked. The prlee tend.
to be -"ticleT' at thle point.
The oon ten t.1 on i.) that under the baalnf( point system of pricing,
t.htl t:ype dellMd CUM" for the individual producer ••ems 11kely to
occur. U.!ng b•• in« potn"t8, reta11a.tory action aga1net a price CU'\·.r
1. re1at1_17 .illPle through the _diu. of d• .t~ating h1splant ..
a punitive baaing point. on the other hand. since every!illl11 quote.

ident.ioal price. to anygi"Yen buyer, an attempt by one buyer to rai ..
hie price above the preftUingba81ng point price i, rutile 8ince the
buyer bu limply' to n1 tch to anoth... 8upplS.er at the old lower price.
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el1mbla'tloD of net tX'elght ·Ilbaorptlon,.

Wot, on.17dSd this

fa.l1 to happen, but manrml11a raised their pri:ce8 and blp,11e4,

that 'higher priees and hlgherml11 1"ealllatlo'o.were now required bY' 18•• 1 The obviouapurpoBe of thisactlon ••• to

conv1nce th. bu7era of ateel,and the publl.c ,in general. that

1twaato their beat interest. to oppose theaband.onment ot
the baaing point 8ystem.Also, the priM increase was long
overdue ainoe steel price.'" had not changed. 8ince the War and
thepr1cea of nearly all other eommodlt1EuI, 1nclud.1ng tboa.
which used steel as a 'basler•• material, bad gone up by

various amounta. 2 The demand tor steel a.t thlat1mewaa 1n

excela ot supply_

Accord1ng to. one Ylr'lter,5the price r1.e

was pa:r-t ota v1.goroua oampaign to g.t Congress to •.mend the

law and legalize basinS point pricing_
The Geneva plant, in line with the general policy in the

steel industry. raised its prices when th.e change over to

t .o.b.

, 4

mill pr.ioing was made •. It wou 1d be difficult. it not impossible,

to 8a7 whether or not the pr.iceot Geneva producte under the
baaing po1nt .".tam had been high enough to, allow tor lome net
frelg)1t absorption,

The mill had been operated a8 a private

concern tor a compara.tlve11 short t:tm. and. the demand for ateel

bad been 1n exceS8 of the supply for the ent1ret1me oeneva
was a baaing point,

On the one band thedletan.ee fromfleneva
ad

1

p.

1. Ifa.eblup,
c1t.,p_, 72.
2. n,Sd.. an ' many others.
3.00"11'1 FAwards ,l loc. cit., P. 837. Also otbers.

or.

Inst1tu~e,
cit. p. 169. (statement made b7
K.T. Norris, presiden', Woprb stamping and Manufacturing
Compan'1... Welt coast Firm.)

4. Economic

8fJ·

to the ••at coast,. w'bleb i,·an outlet tor I10st Qenevapro-

duct., would .uggeat tbattbeba.e price at Gentva •••• et
~at

a point which would allow for net tz-e1ght absorption.

,On the other hand, however, the favorable, position of tbe

oeneva Plantwlth reterenceto raw materialaascompa.:redw1th

tb.e 'West !coa,at producers might suggest tbatthe price could
be.et <a.t Geneva without.ilowanae for n.et freight absorpt10nand .till allow profitable operation.

In anycaee,

the price increased when the basing po1ntaystem was abandoned.

considering the degreeot concentration of control

in theW.stern steel 1ndu8tr7and tbefactthat at the time

the change 1npr1cingpolicyw8.s made demand was 1nexc8ss
or capacity. it doe. not eae. unrfUlsona,ble to aS8umethat
the price increaae on products produQedat aeneva could ver7
e •• 117 ha V'. been tl'le resul tot eons1del'a.t ions othel' than
the geographical pricing policy.

A tactual stud10t the

etfect of the changed-policy on! tbe price. orst.al produced
at the Geneva Plant will have to wait until such time as the

demand for steel decline,. and the sellers market tor steel
is gone.
The very conditions which make the price for steel

sticky and subject to 1nfr.quentChllngea, can 1n the ab.enoe

ot control or co-C)perat1on among the producers, g1ve,rise
to the opposlt8etfect.

m furtber

The tact that ateel 18 used 181'g&l"

productlve processes indicate. tbat most purchases

8'1

. are ma·de in ratherlarseamoun't. by bU1lr• •ho are verr ••,ll

1ntormed concerning .rt.el:p.. lc.....

Thllmlght. make th•••. lea

curve of the individual at.,el, producerextremel,. elastIc

belo. the ma,rlcet price.

(See t1g. 14).

Th. tear of ret.1-

.latory prIce cutting 18 av,,:ry important tactor in making
the price tor ateel

1nfle~ible.

(That is,lt there 18' no

control or co-operation among tbe producers.)
then, that any- prlce

polle71fb~Cb

Itfollows

made tbepo8s1b1,llt7

ot

retaliator)" price cutting lass likely would prov1dean
incentive to ,lower. pri,eea.

This would be part1cularl,. true

U tbe demand fQr steel weresucbbhat only a fraction of
producing capacity were being utilized.

The baaing point
1
system almoatcerta1nly oentralized control, and made reta,l-

iatory act1on·Q comparativel,. simple matter..

It a ml1l cut

prlce. below the established baaing point price, it was com-

paratlvelr ea87 tor the rest of the producer. to make tbis
mill • punitive basing point w1thlower-tban-cost price ••
With this arrangement, all other mills would sell in the

price-cutting mill"a market territory at 1.8sthan coat without mucbharm to them,8lvea since no oneml11 would b.'sellmg

any large percentage of its products in tb1s a;rea.

The p.riae-

cutter. on the oth.er hand would be forced to sell in h1aown
territory at the redUC6d price or in other market areas on

1:. smithies, Fetter, Edwards,; Pegrum, JifilClllnp, and nearly all
other economistaand some bu.1neaamen wb.o have written on
tbe subject agree tbatthis 18 the o&se. (All above authorsworks on this topic have been cited previously intbia paper.)
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Assuming a marketaervedby a tew sellers ot a homogenous product, but in whioh the indi.rldual seller is' not afraid ot price
retaliation. Assuming further, that in this market, there 1s no
collusion, either overt or tacit, among the sellera. Also, in this
market, the buyers ot the product are for the most part purChasing
for further productive uses, and purchasing the product on a comparatively large scale. In other words, assuming that the buyeraare
....11 informed as to the prices quoted by the various producers serving the market in question.

Givan the above market condi tiona, the individual producer could
greatly eXpand his output by lowering his price below I, the price
of the other sellers serving this particular market area. Since the
seller does not expect retaliation in the form of further price cuts
by his principal com.petitors, he can lower his price and greatly expand his sales. The principal reason the individual seller in the
a.bo," market illustration lYouldbe faced 'With a relatively elastic
demand curve beloW' the price point I, 1s the fact that the buyers
he supplies are very well informed 8S to the prices offered by all
possible suppliers, and are buying in sufficient quantity to make
even a comparatively small price change important. On the other
hand, if this seller raised his price, he would. be faced with a
sharp reduction in the amount he could sell tor the same reasons as
he can increase his salessharpl,. below the market price.
that this type of demand curve for the inbette.r chance to occur in the absence ot
than ifth1s system is being used. This
to mean that this type dem.and curve will
be the inevitable outcome of the adopti.on of f'. o. b. mill pricing.
On the contrary, this 8eems rath.er unlikely. The inherent instab-

The contention i8,
dividual producer has a
the baaing point system
should not be construed

illty of a market situation such as that illustrated above should
be recognized. Every producer in the hypothetical market is laced
w1 th this type demand curve J hence, every producer haa incent!va to

lower his price below the prevailing price.

This could very easily

lead to ruinous competition Which, it seems likely .. would ultimate

in 80me sort of collusion among the sellera.

FIGURE 14
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• freight ab.orptlon ba&18. leither "tthe.e alternatlv••
wott14 'be very inviting and. the price-cutter would probably
raise hia price back up to theestabllabed level.

Under an

f.o.b. mill pricing s1'etem, however. reta.liato!'" prioe Cutting

would not be so ea87_

Ira certa1n mill'. pric••

w.r~

lowered

in its ownmarke, area, tbe on17 ••7 retal.1at1onc()uld take

place would be it mill. located neartb18 producer lower.d

their f.o.b. mill priceato

8.

level so low that transporta-

tion eoststo the price-outter'. territory plus their mill

prices would be below the price set by the price-cutter.
The retaliating mills could not keep prices in their own

market t.·r:r1tory up to the p1'6v.loul level since this would
constitute price d18cr1m1na.tlon and. would be clearly illegal

under Seetlon 2

or

the clayton Act as amended.

ThU8. the

retaliating producers would find that tbey had chosen" very

expensive cours. otaetlon, and it 18 qU8.8t1onable whether

retal1atory pr.1cecutting would occur.

The proponent. ot

the basing po1nt87atempoint out that tbe method. of puni-

tive action against a price-cutter deacr1bed above

W.8

never

used while the steel industry was pricing on a dellvered

bas1a.

This seems ,to be the trttthtbut the fact that such

action was po.albl. would certainl,. discourage an,. contem..
pl.ated'price cute.

This analys1.aapp11e. to the Vlestern

steel 1nduatJ'Y aa .ell

states.

8S

to any other seotiQn of the united

90

It should be empba.u,,4tbat price-cutting under 'be
t.o.b.m1l1 pric1n,g

87.t:~.,~.

unde.r a basing point system-.

just easier than it.auld bt
This does not mean tM.t

p~10.

cuts will be tIle inev1t.:ble o'Q,tpowth of the ne. prlc1ng

arrangement.

Pric.cu.tsw111oQcur only where the steel

producers are

80

a1tua.ted that no; producer in the aameor

very nearly the same ar•• can retaliate.
hnporta'nt,ther w11l occur only

s.t

Wha.t is even more

tbe producers 1n anY8rea

act 1ndependen,tl.y instead or tacitly agreeing on a pr10e polioi'
in their area.

Tbe fact tbat Western steel capacity 18 highly

concentrated in the hand,s

or

a few Eastern companl.a make. the

probabl11.t,. that there will be widespread price cu.ts in the

W•• tern market more unlikely than would otherwise be the

OIUJ ••

Further iplpetu8 should be given to price reductions for
steel products b7 th.edeeentrallzing effect ot the new pricing
policy aa mentioned 1n a previous .ection of th18 paper. 1 It
more independent plants are set up closer to the 'mark.tout-

let •• the redu.et1on 1n transportation coats as trell

88

the

added competitive infl'uence sbould stimulate price J;\eductlona.

Also ,anyexceaaco,ta1nyolved 1ncro'8-hau linS and use o.t

other than the cheapest means ot transportation should be
elim1nated and tbe r ••ultan.t savings could be passed on in
the form of lower pr1oe,B.

The seller couldpaa8 the •• coat

reductions on to the conaumez- without a, net change1.n tbe

price he received.

ThuI,

t~o.b.

mill pr1cingahould encour..

age price reductione because of savings in coat. which would
•

reaultunder the 878tem.;, Wb..theX' tb1a outcomt ,,111bfZ'e.l.
uedin the

futurer.ma~JI'.t;Q

be.een, but it eeemerath.:r

obvious that uniform f.o.'b:,l!Jl11 pricing provide. a better

opportunity for low at,eel price. than would be the

OIl • •

undera delivered pJ'iclngI18tem.

Act'llal17, when appl3.;oat1on otthe above analYllI 1s
made to ,the Geneva Plant, it becomes apparent tbat theetrect
w111 be leas than hlma111,other areas and to man". other plarrts.

The existence of &ueh

lars.

capacities at the Geneva Plant

makes it unlikely tbatother plants w111 be encoura.ged to

locate in this imme;d1ate area tor some time to come.

Of

course, 1f the demand for B:te.l on the Pacific Coast Con ..
tinU8S

to grow at the rate experienced through the past tew

year., 80me additional capacity w111 have to be a.dded to the
western atee,l industry in • comparatively ahort time.

Th1a

capacity might verrwell locate in utah, but it would be

becaus8 ot the proximity to raw materials ratber than as a
result of a changed pr1.cing policy.
The Geneva Plant will not experience an,. great ••vini
in coats as a, result of th• •11rn1nat1on

ot croaa-'baul.1ng

since the amount of steel Boldin utah is very small.

This

means that even. if' other producers 1nvadedthe Utah market.
the amount of wastefuloro8a,--baul.1ng would be of minor 81e11!-

lcanee.

FUrther, the Geneva Flant wou.ld probably not bave

Bold any significant amount in the Eastern or even ltldwW•• tern

united stat•••~.n it thlba.s1ng polntayatem war. allowed.
ThU. , no waat.tularosl-hauling would have occurred to and

from these areas.
Final17, the absence of an,. large bodie"

ot ".,ter

between the Ge,neva Plant and ita princlp.alma,rket outlets
makes it extremely unlikely that much saving will accrue as

the result of using cheaper transporta.tion.
There 1s one othertmportant effect on price which
should be cons1dered.

That 1s that the local consumers w111

be gttaranteed a share in any price out to an,. part of

R

pa.r-

t1cula.r producer'. market. For example, 1f the United states
steel Corpora t 10n had wished to lowe%' the pr1.ce otsteel on
the Paoific, COast whtle the basing point system was being

used., the,. could have done one

or

two things.

Either the

baa. pr.1ceat ,Geneva could have been lowel'ed, or a new baling
point for the products could have been established at one
of the Columb1a steel Company Plants on the COast,

If the

base prices at the (leneva Plant had been lowered, the st •• l
consumers 1n Utah would have shared 111 the pr1ce reduction.

If the other alternative bad been tollowed; however, the
price reduction could take place on tho Coaat without any

price change occurring in the Utah market.

Under the present

prl.c1ng system, any reduction in priceeof ('len.va made pro-

duct8 on the

eo•.at

must also be a reduction 'in the local mar-

ket. Thus, the new pricing system guarantees the local eol'!sumeraahare in

~n7

price decline ,which occurs on the

products ot a par" lcular ,lutt.,

One wrlter.ultlDed. up th• •tract or the ne. polio7 with
regard to compet'itlon ti,nd prides as tollow••
"The difference betweenmar'ketcompet1tlon under
f.o,b. mill pr1cine; (wltbstr1ctly (lel1naated
max-kat areas) a.nd. under d1scriminatol'Y delivered. pricing 1s something like thed1tfepence

bet•• en trench wartareand guerilla.art.....
In the former. cas."

allf1g)lt1ng takes place

alons a def1nite battle lin.• , in the- second
ease, the oppos1ngforcas a.re :intermingled
over a broad are•• "l

Il

1. Edgar M. Hoover .. The Location
York, 1948), p •• 51.

ofli1e<?nom~e

Activity, (Ne.

"
SUJlABYANDCOICmS lOllS

Siveral conlJ1deratlonapecul1arto tbe (Je·nt:va plan/t
condition tho effects ot tht.bol1tton ot ba.1n.g point pricmg

on tbl. firm.

One of tbe moat important of the •• 18 the tact

that the plant 1.

80

constructed that .some change in the pro-

portion' of the final product. 18 poa81ble.

Tbat 18, the

Iteel1ngota produced at tbeplant ma7 be either made into
atruQtural shape. or 1ntoplate B.nd thinner than plate
ga.age..

were it not to'lf th. p0881b111ty of changing the

rela.tlve amounts of the •• two t7,P ••

or

semi-tinished .t.,l

products produce4at the acme va plant. it .8oms likel,. 'bbat

the change in prlc1nsmetboda might occasion lome curtail,.
ment of production.

We.tern eapacl.t,. to%'8tructural st.el

1., at pre.ent, more than adequate to meet the demand.

Under

theba.!ng Points7atem, tb1. would cause the We.tern pro-

ducers t.o seek markets outaid.of tbe·l'estem area in which

to dispose of their struotural steellurplua.

The •• out-

side markets lIQuldbe .e,rved on a freight absorpt:l.onbas1a.

or·course, this is not po.sible und.%" unitorm t.o.b .. mill
pricing, and 80me capacit,. tor the production or this

of seml..r'1n1shed steel must laY' idle.

tn-

In the ea •• of the

oentva Plant .. this cut-bae:k in the production of etructural

ste.l can be larp17 absorbed by increasing production of
plate and thinner than plate steel.

Therefore • • a X'egarde

the structu.ral mill. it 8seme likely tha.t the 8...e pollcy
1. b:.1ng tollowed under t.o.b. ml11pricing as would have
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been to 110.,d under the baB1ng point 57atem, i.e •• production

otlt,ruotural.t•• 'l bas largel,.. given ••7 to prOduction of th.
othort1P•• of .em1-t1nlahed.at•• l at. the (len.va Plant.
The ,11;uat1on 11'1 theW.at wlthreprd to plate and thmner
tbl..n plate rolled steel 18 qu.ite d1tterent from the structural

situation.

There seems to be demand tor the •• types ot

8 .ml~

f1nished st.el product •.sufflcient to allow tor effective
utilization of ez1et1:n.g We.t."pncapaclt7_
reterence to tha.e st •• l products

or

The effect with

the changed prl.1ng

system w111 11ke1'y, therefore, be quit.d1tferent.

In the

first pla,ce,. uniform t.o.b. m1l1 pricing w111 eliminate the

po •• lb:111tr ot market penetration b7some Eastern producers
whloh would have been pos8.1ble under tbe baaing point system.
Thus. the ettect of the changed. pricing polle.,- in th18 ca ••

should be favorable to western steel produoers including the

oeneva plant.
Theettect ofaba.ndoning the basing po1nt system on the
future location of .'eol producing facilities. in this region

will be conditioned by the tact that the Geneva Plant •••

constructed to

'.l'V8

large wal't1me demand.,

wartime purposes and to till an extremely
The capacities of the Geneva Plant,

therefor. I are more than adequate to supply demand which
exlst. noworw1l1 probabl,.ex18t tor

80me

time in the future.

It 18 alao extremel,. difficult to .a,. what the effect on
fu.ture location will be because of the large role played 11'1
det.erm!n1ng locatlonot steel mill. by the avallabil1tyand.

extent of raw mater1als.

It 18 conceivable that foreign

,ourct. will bed18oovoredanddevelopedwh1ch .111.110" pro-

duc1l1ontobecarr1ed on at t1d •••. t.r on the Pacific Coaat
".t a co.t whlchcomparea favorab17 w1th the coat. of production at, Geneva.

Becan •• the future' 1.

10

uncertain In

the.e reapect .....bout all that can be said 1. that the
abol1tlon ot the basing point system w111 likely have the

eftect of decentra11z!ng tuture .t •• l product¥n" and Utah

might concelvab17 bea location alte tor some lot' this deceni

./

tral1zed steel capacity.

Ava 1la.bl11ty and extent of raw

mat.rub will be ot more importance than the pricing 8,.stem

lndeterm1ning thiS, however.

The oonoentratlon of market outlets tor tabricated product. on the Pac1tic COaat -.k•• it e"treJflel:r unl.1ke17 that
thecbange 1n prlc1ng systems w111 have any significant

effect on fabrication plant location in. the We.tern united
stat.a.The fact that the

rre1~t

coats on the finished pro-

duct are senerall,. much h1£.iJler than those on the steel whicb
goas into the product as a raw mater1al, makes it prof1table,
in a preponderance of cae •• , tor the fabricator to locate

•• near .s posaible to hi. market.

It seemB unlikely that

the change in pricing metbodswill have enough ettect to
ma.kelocation awa7trom the tnarketmore prof.1table, particularly in the West where the market 18

80

highly concelltrated.

The location of the Geneva plant with refere·nce ·to 1t.
prinCipal markets make. It virtually impoIJ81ble for the local
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ateel conammera to be charged a 100111 monopoly prlec1 which
1.

hlgb.~

than the ,,%*'1.08 _hleh would prevail it the baling

poln.t 'l.tem.ere in use.

Toraiee the priGe to the local

ateel consumers under the pr•• ent uniform

f~o.b.

m111pr1cmg

871tem would mean tbat the price to the rest, and 1n the

'. ca •• ot the Geneva Plant the vastly greater part of the market, would have to be raised as well 8ine. federal law prohibits discrimination inp'rlce bet••en two market area. or
consumers.

Since the Geneva Plant w111becompet1ngw1th

several producers on the West Coast, it 18 a virtual impossibility that this w111 occur.

It is w1thretorence to future steel prices that the
changed pr1cing pollcy might well }Java some sign1ticant

effects, both in Utah and elaewhere.

In the first place,

the decentralizing etfect of the new pricing method should.

introduce elements: of competItion into the aale ot steel
which m1ght not otherwise be present.

The fact that the

buyer. of steel w111 now bet:aeed w1thalternat1ve price •

.trom difterent producers, wberea. they were faoed with a

,mgl.

prioe under tbebasing point system, should stimulate

80me price competition which did. not previously exist.

The

possibilIty ot a steel produoer expanding tlie area ot hie

sale. by price reductions, and the fa.ctthat uniform f.o.b.
mill pricing makeaprlce retaliation more difficult· should
add. to the p0881b111ty

or

mor.competition 1n price.

It

should not be presumed that the adopt1on of t.o.b.m111.
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,priemg by the.te,el 1nduetr1wl11 Qutomatlcal11 make ;1:111
a cOllPGtlt.ive indu.tr7,b.9wtl.er.

ationa are presGnt.
vfJ'1rrstruc,tu~..

and

Too manJ' otbercon.1dtr-

TtleindustrY' 1. not compe't1t1ve in itl
fl,

chah$e1l'l geograpb,ical prlcepolle,.

wl11certa1nly not alter1;bU.

It would a180 be ,a.n error

to assume that the change tot.a.b. mill prioing wl11 .automatically result in lower steel prices.
considerationa might be paramount.

Here apin,· other

There 1s, however,

rea,eon to believe that the obangeto t .• o.b., mill pricing
will have the ettect ot encouraging compet1.tion in pr'lce.

and what 1s equall,. important,encourasing prioe flexibility.
probably the most important conclus1onto be drawn

trom this etudy lsthat it seems very unlike,l,- that the re8ults of the change in p:rlc1ngmethod w111 be world-aba.k.mg.

This is not to say that there w111 be no effects, buttbat
the results 1n the area und;er study w111 in all probability

be

1888

pated.
in

significant

OJ'

pronounced than was widely antlcl ...,

Perhaps this situation is peculiar to this area and

other areas t it m1€pt be that the more .important effects

predicted by writers on the sU''bject will occur.

It may be

allo, that the occurrence o.t'the change in pricing methode
during a period of very high demand,. both fo'r .at.el and for

fabricated goods, ba.• 80ftened the effect., had the change

occurred 1n .. period ot weaker demand, the predictions ot
the major1tyot writers on the subject would have been borne
out.

Or. it, may be_ that the conclusions arrived at in this

\
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stud,. .111 proye to be too UndeI'8st1mated.i

Only atte1'

enough t1Dle haa elapeed tcenable 80m. emperleal s'tudlea
tob. made, w111 tbet1nal word be 8.14.
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